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Abstract
We use administrative linked employer-employee data from Brazil to document that a large
share of the gender pay gap is explained by women working at relatively low-paying employers.
To shed light on the gender pay gap across employers, we establish three novel facts on revealed-
preference ranks of employers by gender. First, employment is concentrated among high-ranked
but not necessarily high-paying employers for both genders. Second, women’s ranking of employ-
ers is less increasing in pay compared to that of men. Third, both pay and ranks of a given employer
differ between women and men. To rationalize these facts, we develop an empirical equilibrium
search model featuring endogenous gender differences in pay, amenities, and recruiting intensities
across employers. The estimated model suggests that compensating differentials explain one-fifth
of the gender gap, that there are significant output and welfare gains from eliminating gender
differences, and that an equal-pay policy fails to close the gender pay gap.
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1 Introduction
During the past decades, the introduction of gender in economic theory and measurement has had a
profound impact on studies of labor markets and the macroeconomy. A common thread in these stud-
ies is the robust empirical finding of a gender pay gap that is partly explained by gender imbalances
in employment across different types of jobs. The implications of this finding crucially depend on
whether the observed pay and employment of women relative to men reflects gender-specific prefer-
ences over jobs or barriers in the labor market. The goal of this paper is to identify the microeconomic
sources of the gender pay gap and to assess its macroeconomic consequences.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we use linked employer-employee data to establish novel facts
on employment segregation, pay heterogeneity, and revealed-preference ranks across employers by
gender. Second, we rationalize these facts by developing and estimating a new empirical equilibrium
search model featuring endogenous gender differences in pay, amenities, and recruiting intensities
across employers. Third, we use the estimated model to decompose the empirical gender pay gap, to
quantify the output and welfare gains from moving to an economy with no gender differences, and
to evaluate the effects of a counterfactual equal-pay policy. In doing so, we provide the first estimates
of output and welfare losses from firm-level gender misallocation.
We base our empirical analysis on rich linked employer-employee data from Brazil between 2007
and 2014. The presence of a large gender earnings gap of around 14 log points makes it interesting
in its own right to study the sources of gender inequality in a nation of over 200 million people.
Such a study is made possible by Brazil’s remarkable data infrastructure, which contains detailed
information on gender-relevant labor market variables, including workers’ educational attainment,
occupation, contractual work hours, and employment histories with information on parental leaves.
We document significant employer segregation, with large differences in female employment
shares across employers, even within sectors. To understand the link between employer segregation
and the gender pay gap, we estimate an empirical specification with gender-specific employer pay
components developed by Card et al. (2016) who, in turn, build on the seminal two-way fixed effects
(FEs) framework by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999, henceforth AKM). Controlling for worker
heterogeneity, we find a gender pay gap of around 8 log points accounted for by gender-specific em-
ployer pay heterogeneity, with women sorting to lower-paying employers relative to men.
To assess the extent to which the gender pay gap across employers reflects gender-specific tastes
versus obstacles, we construct revealed-preference rankings of employers using PageRanks (Page et
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al., 1998; Sorkin, 2018) estimated separately by gender. The PageRank is a network centrality mea-
sure that quantifies the attractiveness of an employer based on the network of worker flows between
employers. Intuitively, higher-ranked employers poach many workers from other high-ranked em-
ployers and lose few workers to low-ranked employers. Importantly, these PageRanks are estimated
independently of any information on employer sizes or pay.
Based on estimated employer pay and revealed-preference ranks, we establish three novel facts.
First, employment is concentrated among high-ranked but not necessarily high-paying employers
for both genders. That is, employers’ revealed-preference ranks are different from pay ranks for both
women andmen. Second, revealed-preference employer ranks are increasing in pay for both genders,
but more so for men than for women. In other words, women are relatively more attracted to employ-
ers with low pay but high values of nonpay characteristics. Third, both within and across genders,
there is significant heterogeneity in employers’ revealed-preference ranks conditional on pay. Specif-
ically, both pay and the rank of a given employer differ between women and men.
To rationalize these facts, we develop a new empirical equilibrium search model featuring en-
dogenous gender differences in pay, amenities, and recruiting intensities across employers. The
model remains analytically tractable while accommodating several competing explanations for the
gender pay gap, including employer productivity differences (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998), gender-
specific compensating differentials (Rosen, 1986), statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1971) based on
expected employment transitions, and taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1971). The model gives
rise to gender-specific job ladders with notable properties. The equilibrium wage equation is log-
additively separable in a worker component and a gender-specific employer component, providing
a microfoundation for the specification used in Card et al. (2016) and our own empirical investiga-
tion. Endogenous worker transitions may be associated with wage declines. Low-productivity and
discriminatory employers survive in equilibrium. Finally, equilibrium spillovers of discrimination
imply that even employers without regard for gender offer different pay to men compared to women.
A key challenge is to separately identify the competing explanations for the gender pay gap. We
identify four sets of gender-specific model parameters using information on worker flows and em-
ployer pay across genders. We estimate, employer-by-employer, gender-specific amenity values as
residuals between employers’ relative pay and revealed-preference ranks in a set of bilateral com-
parisons. We use empirical worker flows to obtain estimates of labor market parameters by gender,
which give rise to heterogeneity in statistical discrimination by firms based on expected employment
transitions. The conditional equilibrium pay gap between coworkers of different genders within em-
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ployers identifies firm-level parameters guiding employers’ preferences over genders. Finally, we
nonparametrically estimate each employer’s gender-specific hiring costs from their empirical recruit-
ing intensities among nonemployed workers.
The estimated model is qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with our empirical facts. Fur-
thermore, the estimation results shed light on the (unobserved) microstructure of labor markets for
men and women. Employer pay, ranks, and amenities are positively correlated within employers
across genders. Employer ranks are relatively more increasing in pay for men, but more increasing in
amenity values for women. We find compensating differentials for both genders. Employers’ prefer-
ence for men over women increases with employer productivity, consistent with Becker (1971)’s idea
that discrimination cannot survive among low-productivity firms with close-to-zero economic profits.
Our firm-level identification allows us to link structural estimates of employer heterogeneity to
observed employer characteristics in the data. We find that women put relatively higher value on
hours flexibility and parental leave benefits, while men are relatively less averse to pay fluctuations
and health risks. Empirical proxies for more-woman-friendly employers include higher routine man-
ual and nonroutine cognitive-interpersonal task intensities, higher female employment shares and
employing women in top-paid positions, and greater financial accountability. These estimates speak
to different reasons why some employers are not gender-blind, including taste-based discrimination
(Becker, 1971) and gender-specific comparative advantages (Goldin, 1992).
With the estimated equilibriummodel in hand, we simulate a number of counterfactuals that shed
light on the sources and consequences of the gender pay gap. In a nonlinear structural decomposition,
we find that compensating differentials in the form of gender-specific amenities explain 1.3 log points
(18 percent) of the gap, employer tastes explain 5.4 log points (73 percent), and gender-specific hiring
costs account for 5.6 log points (76 percent) of the gap. However, given the estimated distribution
of pay and nonpay characteristics across employers, closing the gender pay gap may or may not be
welfare-improving. We find that moving to an economywithout gender differences is associated with
output gains of 3.5 percent andwelfare gains of 3.3 percent, reflecting firm-level misallocation of talent
(Hsieh et al., 2019). In contrast, a hypothetical equal-pay policy is mostly output- and welfare-neutral,
though it has redistributive effects.
Related literature. Several macroeconomic studies have focused on the drivers of trends in female
labor force participation, including structural change (Ngai and Petrongolo, 2017; Buera et al., 2019),
culture (Fernández et al., 2004; Fernández and Fogli, 2009), technology (Greenwood et al., 2005; Al-
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banesi and Olivetti, 2016), and information (Fogli and Veldkamp, 2011; Fernández, 2013). Related
work has linked changes in female participation to economic growth (Heathcote et al., 2017; Hsieh
et al., 2019), unemployment (Albanesi and S¸ahin, 2018), business cycles (Fukui et al., 2019; Albanesi,
2020), and declining dynamism (Peters and Walsh, 2019). Whereas previous macroeconomic studies
have focused on data at the national, geographic, sectoral, or occupational level, our work highlights
firm-level drivers of women’s employment and pay in relation to aggregate output and welfare.
The firm is a natural unit of analysis for studying productivity and factor input distortions in
relation to macroeconomic outcomes (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Lentz
and Mortensen, 2008; Bagger et al., 2014). Little prior work has connected firms’ gender composition
to aggregate output and welfare. If gender-specific barriers impede women’s relocation to higher-
productivity firms, the gender pay gap may be associated with efficiency losses from misallocation
of talent (Hsieh et al., 2019). By combining a rich equilibrium model with detailed linked employer-
employee data, we provide the first estimates of output losses from firm-level gender misallocation.
At the same time, our findings emphasize that output losses do not necessarily reflect welfare losses.
A burgeoning literature highlights firm heterogeneity in explaining empirical pay dispersion for
otherwise identical workers based onAKM’s seminal contribution (Card et al., 2013; Goldschmidt and
Schmieder, 2017; Alvarez et al., 2018; Card et al., 2018; Gerard et al., 2018; Song et al., 2018). We build
on Card et al. (2016)’s empirical specification with gender-specific employer pay components. By es-
timating this specification on Portuguese data, they decompose the gender pay gap across employers
into sorting and rent sharing terms. The fundamental sources of the gender pay gap, in particular
the sorting and rent sharing terms, remain less understood. By providing a microfoundation for this
specification based on worker and firm optimization, our equilibrium model can rationalize gender-
specific sorting and rent-sharing patterns, and hence the empirical gender pay gap.
Our empirical equilibrium search model builds on the pioneering framework of Burdett and
Mortensen (1998). Bontemps et al. (1999, 2000) estimate variants of this framework with heterogeneity
in firm productivity. Other important extensions and empirical applications include Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002), Cahuc et al. (2006), Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013), Meghir et al. (2015), Engbom and
Moser (2018), and Bagger and Lentz (2018). In all these models, firms are ex ante heterogeneous in
only one dimension, namely productivity. As a consequence, all workers agree on a common ranking
of firms based purely on pay considerations. To rationalize our empirical facts on heterogeneity in
employer pay and ranks by gender, we develop and estimate a tractable model with multiple dimen-
sions of firm heterogeneity: productivity, amenity costs, hiring costs, and preferences over genders.
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Other models have addressed gender issues in the labor market. For example, Black (1995),
Bowlus (1997), Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), Albanesi and Olivetti (2009), Flabbi (2010), Gayle and
Golan (2011), and Amano-Patiño et al. (2019) study different forms of wage discrimination. It is
well known that discrimination is hard to empirically distinguish from unobserved productivity dif-
ferences or compensating differentials. In our framework, linked employer-employee data with in-
formation on worker transitions and coworker wages is necessary to separately identify employer
preferences over gender from other dimensions of job heterogeneity.
Gender-specific compensating differentials à la Rosen (1986) have been empirically studied by
Goldin and Katz (2011, 2016). Goldin (2014) and Erosa et al. (2019) highlight the gender-specific value
of job flexibility, which is underlined by recent experimental evidence (Mas and Pallais, 2017, 2019;
Wiswall and Zafar, 2017). Theoretical models with nonspecific job amenities have been developed by
Hwang et al. (1998), Lang and Majumdar (2004), and Albrecht et al. (2018). Sullivan and To (2014),
Hall and Mueller (2018), and Luo and Mongey (2019) estimate nonspecific amenity values using
survey data. These studies are silent on specific job characteristics underlying nonspecific amenity
values. Others have estimated the values of specific job amenities like employer health insurance
(Dey and Flinn, 2005), job security (Jarosch, 2015), occupational fatality risk (Lavetti and Schmutte,
2018), commuting costs (Le Barbanchon et al., 2019; Flemming, 2020), regional preferences (Heise and
Porzio, 2019), and working conditions (Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009; Maestas et al., 2018). These stud-
ies do not relate the value of specific amenities to the overall value of job amenities. We bridge these
two strands of the literature by first estimating nonspecific amenity values and then relating them
back to specific employer characteristics. Like Taber and Vejlin (2016) and Xiao (2020), we estimate
nonspecific amenity values using linked employer-employee data. Unlike them, we identify gender-
specific parameters employer-by-employer without relying on distributional assumptions or indirect
inference. Sorkin (2018) and Lamadon et al. (2019) also estimate nonspecific firm-level amenity val-
ues from linked employer-employee data. Our focus, in contrast to theirs, is on gender. Sorkin (2017)
combines PageRanks with a partial-equilibrium framework to study gender differences in pay and
amenities, highlighting gender differences in the exogenous offer distribution. As a complement to
this prior work, our equilibrium model provides a theory of endogenous gender differences in offer
distributions, which we leverage to study the effects of a counterfactual equal-pay policy.
Outline. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the data. Section 3
presents empirical facts. Section 4 develops the empirical equilibrium searchmodel. Section 5 outlines
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the identification strategy. Section 6 presents estimation results. Section 7 conducts model-based
counterfactuals. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Dataset and Variables
Dataset. Our main data source is the Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS) linked employer-
employee register administered by the BrazilianMinistry of Labor and Employment. Survey response
by all tax-registered firms is mandatory and misreporting is deterred through threat of audits and
fines. The data are available from 1985 onward, with coverage becoming near universal in 1994. Since
2007, the data contain detailed information on reasons and lengths of worker absences, including
parental leaves. In 2015, the country entered a severe recession associated with a large drop in aggre-
gate economic activity. Therefore, we focus on the eight-year period from 2007 to 2014. This leaves us
with a large dataset of over 538 million employment records.
Variables. The data contain unique identifiers for workers and establishments.1 Although reports
are annual, we observe for each job spell the precise start and end dates, mean monthly earnings
(henceforth “earnings”), and contractual work hours (henceforth “hours”). This allows us to avoid
aggregation bias in classifying job-to-job transitions (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2018). Our baseline
analysis uses earnings with flexible indicator controls for hours. However, for parts of our analysis
we also construct hourly wages (henceforth “wages”) as earnings divided by the number of hours.
Other key variables include gender in two categories, race in five categories, nationality in 37 cate-
gories, educational attainment in nine categories, worker age in years, five-digit sector codes with 672
categories, municipality codes with 5,565 categories, six-digit occupation codes with 2,383 categories,
and tenure in years. In addition, the data contain start and end dates of any absences from work and
the reason for absence. We exploit the full panel dimensions of the data going back to 1985 with the
tenure variable to impute actual (not just potential) formal-sector work experience in years.2
1All of our analysis is at the level of the establishment, which we intercheangably refer to as “employer” or “firm.”
2The distinction between actual and potential experience is important in general but explains little of the empirical
gender pay gap; see Figure 11 in Appendix A.1.
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2.2 Sample Selection
We first restrict attention to male and female workers between the ages of 18 and 54 who worked at
least one hour per week with earnings at or above the federal minimum wage. We then keep for each
worker-year combination the highest-paid among all longest employment spells. Next, we iteratively
drop singleton observations defined either by the combination of establishment identifier and gender
or by worker identifier. We also impose a minimum establishment size threshold of ten nonsingleton
workers per year on average.3 Finally, we require that establishments appear in our sample in at least
four out of the eight years. Together, the last two selection criteria ensure that we are dealing with a
set of reasonably large and stable establishments for which pay policies and amenity values can be
credibly estimated.
To separately identify worker and employer pay components, we follow Abowd et al. (2002) in
constructing the largest connected set, where connections are formed through worker mobility be-
tween establishments over time. In the language of graph theory, there are two types of connected
sets. A weakly connected set is one in which each establishment is connected to another establishment
through at least one incoming or outgoing worker. A strongly connected set is one in which each estab-
lishment is connected to another node through at least one incoming and one outgoing worker. For
the AKMmodel to be identified, it is sufficient to restrict attention to weakly connected sets. However,
to estimate revealed-preference ranks of employers using PageRanks requires restricting attention to
strongly connected sets (Sorkin, 2018). Therefore, we restrict attention to the largest strongly con-
nected set (henceforth “connected set”).
2.3 Summary Statistics
Table 11 in Appendix A.2 presents summary statistics on observations in the connected set in 2007,
in 2014, and pooled across 2007–2014.4 In the pooled sample, we have over 231 million worker-years,
corresponding to over 55 million unique workers and over 222,000 unique establishments. Around
38 percent of these observations are for women. The raw gender gap in earnings is around 14 log
points and the gap in wages is around 6 log points. Compared to women, men are more likely to be
nonwhite and hold at most a middle school degree.5 Men are significantly younger, work at smaller
3Following Sorkin (2018), nonsingleton workers are those who are observed at least one more time at a future date.
While the RAIS data cover only Brazil’s formal sector, the employer size restriction implies that the vast majority of informal
establishments would be excluded from our analysis in any case (Ulyssea, 2018; Dix-Carneiro et al., 2019).
4Also in Appendix A.2, we show the same summary statistics in the data before making sample selections and restricting
the data to the connected set (Table 12) and comparing the two samples (Table 13).
5Since race information is missing for a significant share of observations, we report here the conditional mean.
8
and younger establishments, work more hours, and have less tenure compared to women.6
3 Employer Heterogeneity and the Gender Gap
A classical Mincerian analysis of the gender gap in pay is presented in Appendix B.1. Standard Min-
cerian controls only partly explain the empirical gender gap. Thus, building on AKM’s seminal con-
tribution, we investigate the role of employer heterogeneity in relation to the gender gap.
3.1 Gender Segregation Across Employers
Womenmade up 38 percent of Brazil’s formal sector employment over the period of 2007–2014. How-
ever, women were highly segregated across employers, even within industries. Figure 1 shows a
histogram of female employment shares in 2014. Around 28 percent of establishments had less than
10 percent women among their workforce. In contrast, if women were equally distributed across
employers, we would see a single bar of height 10 in the 30–40 percent category.
Figure 1. Histogram of female employment shares, 2014
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS.
We show in Appendix B.2 that gender segregation is a robust empirical phenomenon over time
(Figure 12), within sectors (Figure 13), and across different employer sizes (Figure 14). Figure 15 in
Appendix B.3 shows that employment levels of men and women within establishments are positively
but imperfectly correlated. In Appendix B.4, we quantify the degree of gender segregation across
employers by defining and estimating an employer segregation index, which we find to be higher
than analogous indices estimated across industries, occupations, or states.
6In Brazil, full-time employment involves either 40 or 44 hours of work per week, depending on the employer.
9
3.2 Quantifying Employer Pay Heterogeneity
To understand the link between employer segregation and the gender pay gap, we estimate a wage
equation with gender-specific employer pay components developed by Card et al. (2016), building on
the seminal two-way FEs specification by AKM. This allows for the possibility that a given employer
has two pay policies—one for each gender. Formally, we model earnings of individual i in year t
working at establishment j = J(i, t), denoted yijt, as
yijt = Xitβ + αi + 1 [genderi = M]ψ
M
j + 1 [genderi = F]ψ
F
j + ε ijt, (1)
where Xit is a vector of gender-specific worker characteristics including a set of restricted education-
age dummies aswell as dummies for hours, occupation, tenure, actual experience, and education-year
combinations; αi is a person FE; ψMj and ψ
F
j are the male and female employer FEs, respectively; and
ε ijt is a residual term.7 By including a set of person FEs, this specification controls for selection of men
and women across establishments based on unobserved time-invariant worker characteristics such as
ability. In estimating equation (1), our main focus is on estimates of the gender-specific employer FEs,
ψMj and ψ
F
j .
As is the case in all two-way fixed models, at least one normalization must be made regarding the
intercept or mean of the employer FEs versus the person FEs. In our case, the model with gender-
specific employer FEs requires two normalizations—one for each gender. Consistent with the the-
oretical model presented later, we follow Card et al. (2016) and Gerard et al. (2018) in normalizing
the employer FEs of both genders to be of mean zero in the restaurant and fast-food sector, which,
arguably, is populated by low-surplus employers.8
We now turn to our main object of interest in equation (1), namely the gender-specific employer
FEs.9 Panel (a) of Figure 2 plots the distribution of employer FEs by gender. The distribution for
women has visibly lowermean and lower variance than that for men. Panel (b) of the figure shows the
distribution of within-employer differences in FEs for dual-gender establishments. The distribution
is relatively dispersed compared to its mean of around 2 log points.
7To identify age, time, and worker FEs simultaneously, we restrict the age-pay profile to be flat around ages 45–49, which
is approximately consistent with empirical raw-earnings profiles. See Appendix B.5 for details.
8For robustness, we experimented with alternative normalizations for gender-specific employer FEs. Separately, we
have repeated our analysis based on a wage equation without worker FEs, making the normalization redundant.
9In Appendix B.5, we present auxiliary results relating to the AKM equation, including estimated gender-specific hours
FEs (Figure 16), occupation FEs (Figure 17), actual-experience FEs (Figure 18), tenure FEs (Figure 19), education-year FEs
(Figure 20), and education-age FEs (Figure 21).
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Figure 2. Predicted AKM employer FEs for women and men
(a) Gender-specific employer FE distributions
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(b) Gender-specific employer FE distributions
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: Dashed vertical line shows mean of the distribution.
Table 1 shows a log-earnings variance decomposition.10 Men have a slightly higher variance of log
earnings, with 52.4 log points, compared to 51.1 log points for women. For both genders, the largest
variance component is due to estimated worker FEs, which account for 24 percent for men and 25
percent for women. Employer FEs account for 12 percent of the variance of earnings for men and 11
percent for women. The positive covariance terms are primarily attributed to the covariance between
worker and employer FEs, education-age and employer FEs, and actual experience and employer
FEs. The correlation between person and employer FEs is around 23 percent for men and 27 percent
for women. For each gender, the largest connected set spans close to the full data. Finally, the model
explains around 93 percent of the variation in log earnings.
10To be precise, Table 1 presents plug-in estimators of the variance components. In ongoing work, we are adapting
the leave-one-out estimator by Kline et al. (2019), which implements a jackknife bias correction for limited-mobility bias
(Andrews et al., 2008, 2012), to a dataset of significantly larger size like ours.
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Table 1. Variance decomposition based on gender-specific employer FEs model
Men Women
Variances Level Share Level Share
Variance of log earnings 0.524 0.511
Components of variance of log earnings:
Person FEs 0.125 0.238 0.129 0.252
Employer FEs 0.064 0.122 0.056 0.109
Education-year FEs 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001
Education-age FEs 0.061 0.116 0.055 0.107
Hours FEs 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002
Occupation FEs 0.013 0.025 0.012 0.023
Tenure FEs 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.010
Actual experience FEs 0.034 0.065 0.023 0.045
Covariances 0.185 0.352 0.198 0.387
Residual 0.037 0.071 0.033 0.064
Correlation person/employer FEs 0.226 0.270
Observations 143,745,869 88,059,962
Largest connected set 1.000 0.999
R2 0.929 0.936
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: Variance components based on earnings equation (1).
3.3 Between Versus Within-Employer Pay Differences
From here on we will focus on differences in the gender-specific employer components (henceforth
“gender gap”). Using a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, we can write the gender gap as
γe ≡ Ei,t
[
ψMJ(i,t)
∣∣∣ genderi = M]−Ei,t [ψFJ(i,t)∣∣∣ genderi = F]
= Ei,t
[
ψMJ(i,t) − ψ
F
J(i,t)
∣∣∣ genderi = M]︸ ︷︷ ︸
within-employer gender pay gap
+
(
Ei,t
[
ψFJ(i,t)
∣∣∣ genderi = M]−Ei,t [ψFJ(i,t)∣∣∣ genderi = F])︸ ︷︷ ︸
between-employer gender pay gap
(2)
= Ei,t
[
ψMJ(i,t) − ψ
F
J(i,t)
∣∣∣ genderi = F]︸ ︷︷ ︸
within-employer gender pay gap
+
(
Ei,t
[
ψMJ(i,t)
∣∣∣ genderi = M]−Ei,t [ψMJ(i,t)∣∣∣ genderi = F])︸ ︷︷ ︸
between-employer gender pay gap
. (3)
Equations (2) and (3) are two alternative decompositions of the total gender gap, γe, into two terms.
The within-employer pay gap or pay-policy component is the mean difference in gender-specific employer
FEs weighted by the distribution of men and women, respectively. It reflects differences in pay be-
tween women and men at the same establishment. The between-employer pay gap or sorting component
is the difference between genders in meanmale-employer FEs and female-employer FEs, respectively.
It reflects differences in pay between men and women due to their different allocations across estab-
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lishments.11
Figure 22 in Appendix B.6 graphically illustrates estimates of the two components of the decom-
positions in equations (2) and (3). Results of the decomposition are shown in Table 2. Out of the total
gender pay gap of 8.4 log points, 24 percent (5 percent) is attributed to the pay-policy component in
Decomposition 1 (2). The remainder is attributed to the sorting component. This evidence suggests
that women systematically work at lower-paying employers compared to men.
Table 2. Oaxca-Blinder decompositions of the gender pay gap due to employer heterogeneity
Pay-policy component Sorting component
Gender pay gap Level Share Level Share
Decomposition 1 0.084 0.020 0.241 0.064 0.759
Decomposition 2 0.084 0.004 0.047 0.080 0.953
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: Decompositions 1 and 2 correspond to equations (2) and (3),
respectively.
3.4 Life-Cycle Patterns and Event Study Analysis Around Parental Leaves
An obvious candidate factor that may be behind some of the hitherto documented patterns is related
to childbirth. In Appendix B.7, we study life-cycle patterns of employer pay by gender and parental
status. In Appendix B.8, we conduct an event study analysis around childbirth, as proxied by parental
leave, following themethodology in Kleven et al. (2016). While we find significant gender gaps in par-
ticipation and earnings associated with childbirth, our analysis suggests that firm pay heterogeneity
is not the only, or even a very important, factor behind these gaps.
3.5 Revealed-Preference Employer Rankings by Gender
To what extent does the gender pay gap reflect a gender utility gap? To answer this question, one
must take into account both pay and nonpay characteristics of jobs for both genders. To this end, we
estimate gender-specific revealed-preference rankings of employers using the PageRank index. The
PageRank is a network centrality measure developed by Page et al. (1998) to rank websites for the
web search engine Google that was first used in an economic context by Sorkin (2018).
In a labor market context, the PageRank is defined as follows. Let g ∈ {M, F} index a worker’s
gender, let j ∈ J g = {j1, j2, . . . , jNg} index a set of Ng gender-specific employers, and let t ∈ T
11Note that the sorting component is invariant to the choice of the normalization of gender-specific employer FEs. Coin-
cidentally, this will be the main object of interest in our study. The pay-policy component, on the other hand, depends on
the normalization of men’s relative to women’s employer FEs.
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index time. We denote by ngj,j′,t the number of workers of gender g transitioning from employer j to
employer j′ at time t, by ngj,j′ = ∑t∈T n
g
j,j′,t the time aggregation of gender-specific flows between the
two employers, and by ngj,. = ∑j′ n
g
j,j′ the number of workers of gender g flowing out from employer
j. Let Bg(j) =
{
j′ : ngj′,j ≥ 1
}
denote the set of employers who have ever lost a worker of gender g to
employer j. Let d ∈ [0, 1] be a damping factor. The PageRank index, sg (j), is a probability distribution
over all employers j ∈ J g such that
sg (j) =
1− d
Ng
+ d ∑
j′∈Bg(j)
w
g
j′,js
g
(
j′
)
, ∀j ∈ J g, ∀g, (4)
where wgj′,j = n
g
j′,j/n
g
j′,. is a weight equal to the share of worker flows from employer j
′ to employer
j as a fraction of all worker flows from employer j′. Intuitively, employers with a high PageRank
index poach many workers from other employers with high PageRank indices and lose few workers
to other employers with low PageRank indices. The damping factor d represents the weight on the
poaching term in a convex combination with equal employer weights. Based on PageRank indices,
we compute gender-specific PageRanks rg(j) for every employer j ∈ J g as the rank of the PageRank
indices, with the lowest rank normalized to 0 and the highest rank normalized to 100.
Interestingly, the PageRank index represents the asymptotic share of time a representative worker
(“random surfer”) who switches jobs by following the network of empirical worker flows would
spend at a given employer. Following Sorkin (2018), we choose as the damping factor d = 1 in all our
applications. By estimating PageRank indices on the strongly connected set, we avoid absorbing states
(“rank sinks”), in which a worker could get indefinitely stuck at an employer. This interpretation of
the PageRank index is particularly close to the definition of an employer rank in a large class of on-the-
job search models, including the one we develop. Note also that an employer’s PageRank does not
directly depend on its pay or size. Indeed, in computing PageRanks, we did not use any information
on worker wages or the number of workers at any employer.
Based on equation (4), we compute employer PageRanks separately by gender.12 Wenow establish
three facts relating to employer heterogeneity in pay and ranks within and across gender.13
12In Appendix B.9, we show that the resulting PageRanks are strongly but imperfectly correlated with gender-specific
employer FEs in pay. PageRank estimates are also strongly but imperfectly correlated with two other popular employer
rank measures, namely the poaching rank (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2008; Bagger and Lentz, 2018) and the net poach-
ing rank (Haltiwanger et al., 2018; Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2018). An advantage of the PageRank over the other two
rank measures is that it uses more information per worker transition in constructing an employer ranking, which reduces
spurrious misclassifications of employer ranks.
13For the remainder of this section, we will study gender-population-weighted estimates of the unweighted PageRanks
as described above. Note that PageRanks are not restricted to having any particular mean value (e.g., 50) by construction
since the PageRank estimation is independent of the cross-sectional employment distribution.
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Fact 1. Employment is concentrated among high-ranked but not necessarily high-paying employers for both
genders.
Figure 3 compares the employment distributions of men and women across pay ranks and across
employer ranks. Panel (a) shows employment is weakly positively related to pay for both genders.
Panel (b), on the other hand, shows that employment is strongly related to employer ranks for both
genders. Furthermore, the rank-based employment distribution of women looks relatively more sim-
ilar to that of men than it does for the pay-based employment distribution. Women’s mean employer
pay rank is 53.9 while men’s is 58.3, implying a gender gap in pay ranks of 4.4 percentiles. On the
other hand, women’s mean employer rank is 73.7 while men’s is 74.4, implying a gender gap in em-
ployer ranks of 0.7 percentiles.
Figure 3. Densities over pay ranks and employer ranks, by gender
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS.
Fact 2. Mean employer ranks are more increasing in pay ranks for men than for women.
Figure 4 shows that employer ranks are positively correlated with pay ranks for both men and
women. However, the employer rank-pay gradient is steeper for men than for women, especially in
the bottom half of employer pay rank distribution. This suggests that there exist low-paying jobs that
are at the same time relatively attractive for women, and this is less so the case for men. Therefore,
pay is a relatively more important determinant the overall evaluation of an employer for men than
for women.14
14Appendix B.10 presents several robustness checks. Figure 27 shows the relationship between employer ranks and pay
ranks across sectors. Table 17 shows that this fact is not driven by sectoral or geographic differences. Table 18 shows that
this fact is consistent with the dynamics of pay for different worker transitions across employer ranks.
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Figure 4. Employer rank and pay, by gender
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Fact 3. There is significant heterogeneity in employer ranks conditional on pay within and across genders.
Figure 5 shows that there is significant dispersion in employer ranks conditional on pay for men
in Panel (a) and for women in Panel (b). This suggests heterogeneity in employers’ nonpay character-
istics.15 For both men and women, ranks are relatively more dispersed at low-pay employers than at
high-pay employers. This suggests that establishments with high pay are also high in utility. This is
consistent with either their pay being high enough to compensate for their level of (dis-)amenity, or
alternatively, their amenities being high on top of their high pay.16
Figure 6 shows that there is also significant within-employer between-gender dispersion in pay
ranks in Panel (a) and in employer ranks in Panel (b). Pay and employer ranks are strongly positively
correlated within employers across genders. This is consistent with the idea that an employer’s pro-
ductivity and amenities, such as its location and certain benefit policies, are partly shared by its male
and female workers. Cross-gender employer ranks are also relatively more dispersed than cross-
gender pay ranks. This may reflect that productivity (e.g., technology or management practices) is
shared more freely across genders compared to valuations of certain amenities (e.g., hours flexibility
or parental leave policies). Finally, men and women closely agree on their rankings of top employers,
both in terms of pay ranks and employer ranks, but agree less on lower-ranked employers.17
15Figure 30 in Appendix B.11 shows that the standard deviation of employer ranks is similarly decreasing in employer
pay ranks for men and women.
16Appendix B.11 shows that the same qualitative conclusions apply when, for robustness, we compare employer ranks
across pay ranks by industry for women (Figure 28) and for men (Figure 29).
17For robustness, Appendix B.11 shows the same relation between female and male pay ranks (Figure 31) and that be-
tween female and male employer ranks (Figure 32) by industry. The same qualitative conclusions apply within industries.
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Figure 5. Percentiles of employer rank distribution conditional on pay ranks, by gender
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(b) Women
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS.
Figure 6. Percentiles of female versus male employer pay and ranks
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(b) Ranks
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4 Model
Addressing the empirical facts requires a structural model with the following ingredients. First and
foremost, the model must allow for an employer’s revealed-preference rank to differ from its pay
rank. To rationalize this, workers in the model value an employer’s amenities in addition to pay.
Second, the model must generate differences in pay and amenities across employers. To rationalize
this, the labor market is modeled as frictional. Third, the model must admit gender differences in
pay, revealed-preference ranks, and employment within a firm. To rationalize this, employers in the
model post gender-specific wages, amenities, and job vacancies. We combine these ingredients in an
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equilibrium model of the labor market.
4.1 General Environment
A measure 1 of workers and measure E of firms meet in a continuous-time frictional labor market.
4.2 Workers
Workers are infinitely lived, risk neutral, and discount the future at rate ρ. They permanently differ
in ability a ∈ [a, a] and gender g ∈ {M, F} with measure µa,g such that ∑g=M,F
´
a µa,g da = 1. At any
point in time, they find themselves either employed or nonemployed.18
Job search. While nonemployed, workers receive flow utility ba,g and engage in random job search
within segmented labor markets by worker type. Search is random in the sense that workers cannot
direct their search to specific firms. Labor markets are segmented in the sense that workers search for
jobs in a market specific to their type. While employed, workers receive flow utility x = w+ pi equal
to the sum of their wage, w, and job amenity value, pi. Employed workers also engage in on-the-job
search within the same segmented markets.
As a result of job search, workers receive regular job offers with arrival rate λua,g from nonem-
ployment and with rate λea,g from employment. While regular on-the-job offers admit free disposal,
workers also receive mandatory on-the-job offers (sometimes termed a “Godfather shock,” or an offer
one cannot refuse) at rate λGa,g in both employment states. We think of the latter as capturing, among
other things, spousal relocation problems and other idiosyncratic reasons for switching jobs. We will
write λea,g = s
e
a,gλ
u
a,g and λ
G
a,g = s
G
a,gλ
u
a,g, where s
e
a,g and s
G
a,g are the relative hazards of regular and
mandatory on-the-job offers, respectively.
A job offer is an opportunity to work at some firm with associated wage w and amenity value pi,
drawn from a distribution F˜(w,pi), which workers take as exogenous but that is determined endoge-
nously through firms’ equilibrium decisions. Since a worker’s flow utility x = w+ pi is sufficient for
summarizing their state, jobs will be ranked on a ladder according to x, andwe can restrict attention to
the implied flow-utility offer distribution F(x). A job can be terminated endogenously when a worker
with flow utility x in their current job accepts an offer from a higher-utility job at rate λea,g(1− F(x)),
18In mapping the model to the data, we think of the “nonemployed” in the model as capturing the pool of the unem-
ployed, workers on temporary (parental or other) leave, workers marginally attached to the labor force, and workers in
informal employment. The estimation of labor market parameters will take into account that some workers might spend
longer periods outside of formal employment due to these factors.
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or exogenously: at rate λGa,g the worker relocates to a randomly drawn job, and at rate δa,g the worker
becomes nonemployed.
Value functions. The value of an employed worker of type (a, g) in a job with flow utility x is
summarized as follows:
ρSa,g(x) = x+ λ
e
a,g
ˆ
x′≥x
[
Sa,g(x
′)− Sa,g(x)
]
dFa,g(x
′) + λGa,g
ˆ
x′
[
Sa,g(x
′)− Sa,g(x)
]
dFa,g(x
′)
+ δa,g
[
Wa,g − Sa,g(x)
]
. (5)
Analogously, the value of a nonemployed worker of type (a, g) is summarized as follows:
ρWa,g = ba,g + (λ
u
a,g + λ
G
a,g)
ˆ
x′
max
{
Sa,g(x
′)−Wa,g, 0
}
dFa,g(x
′) . (6)
Policy function. Strict monotonicity of the value function Sa,g(x) implies that the optimal job accep-
tance strategy of a nonemployed worker will be characterized by a threshold rule with reservation
flow utility φa,g. Thus, a nonemployed worker will accept an offer if x ≥ φa,g and reject it other-
wise. The reservation flow utility simply equals the sum of the flow value of nonemployment plus
the forgone option value of receiving job offers while nonemployed:
φa,g = ba,g + (λ
u
a,g − λ
e
a,g)
ˆ
x′≥φa,g
1− Fa,g(x′)
ρ + δa,g + λGa,g + λ
e
a,g
[
1− Fa,g(x′)
] dx′ . (7)
Employed workers in a job with flow utility x simply accept any job that delivers flow utility x′ such
that x′ > x.
Nonemployment and utility dispersion. Since in equilibrium no firm will post a contract worth
less than φa,g in any market (a, g), the steady-state nonemployment rate for each worker type is
ua,g =
δa,g
δa,g + λua,g + λ
G
a,g
. (8)
The cross-sectional distribution of flow utilities is given by
Ga,g(x) =
Fa,g(x)
1+ κea,g
[
1− Fa,g(x)
] ,
19
where κea,g = λ
e
a,g/(δa,g + λ
G
a,g) governs the effective speed of workers climbing the job ladder.
4.3 Firms
Firms differ in four dimensions. First, they have heterogeneous productivity p ∈ [p, p] ⊂ R++ as
in Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Second, firms differ in a set of employer wedges za,g ∈ [z, z] ⊂ R
representing the firm’s disutility from worker type (a, g), as in Becker (1971). Third, firms are hetero-
geneous in a set of amenity cost shifters cpi,0a,g > 0, as in Hwang et al. (1998). Finally, firms differ in a
set of vacancy cost shifters cv,0a,g > 0. Thus, a firm’s type is j = (p, {za,g}a,g, {c
v,0
a,g}a,g, {c
pi,0
a,g }a,g), which
we assume is distributed continuously according to Γ(j).
Wages, amenities, and job vacancies. Firms deliver value to workers through a combination of
two channels. First, they post in each market a wage rate wa,g that is constant for the duration of
the employment spell. Second, they also post a market-specific value of amenities pia,g. Following
Hwang et al. (1998), we assume that the cost of producing a level of amenities pia,g must be paid per
worker of type (a, g) employed at the firm, and that the per-worker amenity flow cost can be written
as cpia,g(pia,g) = c
pi,0
a,g × c˜
pi
a,g(pia,g), where the function c˜
pi
a,g(·) satisfies c˜
pi
a,g(0) = 0, ∂c˜
pi
a,g(0)/∂pi = 0, and
∂c˜pia,g(pi)/∂pi, ∂
2c˜pia,g(pi)/∂pi
2
> 0 for all pi > 0 and all (a, g). In order to recruit workers and produce
output, firms also post va,g job vacancies in each market subject to flow cost cva,g(va,g) = c
v,0
a,g× c˜
v(pia,g),
where the function c˜v(·) satisfies c˜v(0) = 0, ∂c˜v(0)/∂v = 0, and ∂c˜v(v)/∂v, ∂2c˜v(v)/∂v2 > 0 for all
v > 0.
Production. A firm with productivity p employing {la,g}a,g workers of each type produces output
according to the following linear production technology:
y(p, {la,g}a,g) = p ∑
g=M,F
ˆ
a
ala,g da .
Employer wedges. In addition to output specified above, the model allows employers to care about
employing different worker types. We model this as a set of employer wedges {za,g}a,g which, as
two special cases, may capture either taste-based discrimination as in Becker (1971) or firm-level com-
parative advantages in productivity across genders related to “brain versus brawn” (Goldin, 1992;
Rendall, 2018). We restrict these wedges to take the form za,g = 1[g = F]za, where za guides an
employer’s relative preference for employing men over women among workers of ability a.
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Value function. Firms post wages, amenities, and vacancies in each market to maximize steady-
state flow payoff. The value Π(j) of a firm of type j = (p, {za}a, {c
v,0
a,g}a,g, {c
pi,0
a,g }a,g) is given by
ρΠ (j) = max
{wa,g ,pia,g ,va,g}a,g
 ∑
g=M,F
ˆ
a
[
pa− wa,g − c
pi
a,g(pia,g)− za,g
]
la,g(wa,g,pia,g, va,g)− cva,g(va,g) da
 . (9)
4.4 Matching
The effective mass of job searchers in market (a, g) equals
Ua,g = µa,g
[
ua,g + s
e
a,g(1− ua,g) + s
G
a,g
]
, ∀(a, g). (10)
The total mass of vacancies posted in market (a, g) across firm types j equals
Va,g = E
ˆ
j
va,g(j) dΓ(j), ∀(a, g). (11)
In the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides tradition, a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant
returns to scale combines the effective mass of job searchers with the total mass of job vacancies to
produce a measure of matches between workers and firms, ma,g, according to
ma,g = χa,gV
α
a,gU
1−α
a,g , ∀(a, g),
where χa,g > 0 is the matching efficiency and α ∈ (0, 1) is the matching elasticity with respect to
aggregate vacancies. Define labor market tightness as
θa,g =
Va,g
Ua,g
, ∀(a, g). (12)
The job-finding rates among nonemployed workers, λua,g, the job-finding rates among the employed,
λea,g, the arrival rates of mandatory offers, λ
G
a,g, and firms’ job-filling rates, qa,g, are given by
λua,g = χa,gθ
α
a,g, λ
e
a,g = sa,gλ
u
a,g, λ
G
a,g = s
G
a,gλ
u
a,g, and qa,g = χa,gθ
α−1
a,g , ∀(a, g). (13)
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4.5 Firm Size Distribution
The following Kolmogorov forward (or Fokker-Planck) equation describes the law of motion of firm
sizes given a firm’s flow-utility and vacancy policy (x, v), the market distribution of flow utilities
Fa,g(x), and market tightness θa,g:
l˙a,g(x, v) =
[
−δa,g − λ
e
a,g
[
1− Fa,g(x)
]
− λGa,g
]
la,g(x, v) +
[
ua,g + (1− ua,g)sea,gGa,g(x) + s
G
a,g
ua,g + (1− ua,g)sea,g + sGa,g
]
vqa,g.
Solving for the stationary firm size distribution, we find
la,g(x, v) =
(
1
δa,g + λGa,g + λ
e
a,g
[
1− Fa,g(x)
])2 v
Va,g
µa,g(ua,g + s
G
a,g)λ
u
a,g(δa,g + λ
G
a,g + λ
e
a,g). (14)
4.6 Equilibrium Characterization
We define a stationary equilibrium of the economy in Appendix C.1. The assumedmarket segmentation
and linearity of the production technology allow us to keep this problem tractable in spite of the
many dimensions of worker and firm heterogeneity. These assumptions allow us to divide the firm’s
problem into separate subproblems by market. Conditional on productivity, a firm’s optimal choice
in each market is essentially independent of all other markets, which means that we can solve the
firm’s problem in each market in isolation.
For any postedwage-amenity combination, firms find themselves ranked on amarket-specific lad-
der according to their flow-utility offer x. An argument analogous to that in Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) shows that the equilibrium offer distribution Fa,g(x) and the cross-sectional distribution Ga,g(x)
are continuous and strictly increasing for x > max
{
pa− 1[g = F]z , φa,g
}
in each market (a, g) up to
some maximum value. Next, we characterize firms’ optimal policy functions.
Lemma 1 (Optimal amenities). A firm’s optimal amenity policy pi∗a,g(·) is strictly decreasing in its amenity
cost shifter cpi,0a,g and is invariant to all other parameters. Furthermore, 0 < cpia,g(pi
∗
a,g) < pi
∗
a,g.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.1.
Lemma 1 extends to our setting a key result in Hwang et al. (1998), who also assume that firms
are heterogeneous in their convex-increasing per-worker cost of amenities. Inuitively, firms optimally
offer amenities up to the point where the marginal cost of amenities equals that of wages, which
equals one. That the cost-minimization problem does not depend on a firm’s productivity, employer
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wedge, or recruiting costs follows from two assumptions: that worker utility is additively separable
between wages and amenities and that the amenity cost is paid per worker. An implication of Lemma
1 is that, due to the bijection between firm-specific amenity cost shifters and optimal amenity values,
we can treat pi∗a,g as an exogenous firm-level parameter. Furthermore, in model counterfactuals, a
firm’s optimal amenity choice remains at the estimated value unless there are changes to its amenity
cost function relative to its wage cost function.
Define a firm’s composite productivity in market (a, g) as p˜a,g = pa+ pia,g − cpia,g(pia,g)− za,g. We can
treat p˜a,g as an exogenous firm characteristic, allowing us to rewrite the problem of a firm as
ρΠa,g( p˜a,g, cv,0a,g) = max
x,v
{[
p˜a,g − x
]
la,g(x, v)− cva,g(v)
}
, ∀(a, g). (15)
Therefore, the current model is essentially isomorphic to one without amenities or employer wedges
but with two modifications.19 First, productivity p is replaced by composite productivity p˜. Second,
wages w are replaced by flow utility x. This isomorphism allows us to derive comparative statics with
respect to the different components of p˜a,g.
Lemma 2 (Optimal market selection). A firm optimally employs workers in market (a, g) if p˜a,g > φa,g.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.2.
A firm makes positive monetary profits if pa + pia,g − cpia,g(pia,g) > φa,g.
20 However, Lemma 2
states that, due to the presence of employer wedges, this condition is neither necessary nor sufficient
for a firm to select into a market. Depending on za in relation to the monetary surplus pa + pia,g −
cpia,g(pia,g) − φa,g in each market, the firm may hire any combination of genders: both, either one, or
none (in which case it does not operate).
Lemma 3 (Optimal vacancies). A firm’s optimal vacancy policy v∗a,g(·) is strictly increasing in productivity
p, strictly decreasing in the vacancy cost shifter cv,0a,g for all worker types, and strictly decreasing (constant) in
za for women (men).
Proof. See Appendix C.2.3.
The intuition behind Lemma 3 is that more productive firms have a higher marginal payoff per
contacted worker; thus they invest more into recruiting both men and women. The opposite is true
19See Engbom and Moser (2018) for an example of such a model.
20We implicitly assume here that a firm’s productivity is high enough to pay the minimum wage in monetary units.
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with regards to female vacancies at firms with a higher employer wedge in their payoff function.
Naturally, firms with a higher vacancy cost post fewer vacancies for both genders.
Lemma 4 (Optimal flow utility and wages). A firm’s optimal flow-utility policy x∗a,g(·) and wage policy
w∗a,g(·) are strictly increasing in p for all worker types, constant in the vacancy cost shifter c
v,0
a,g for all worker
types, and strictly decreasing (constant) in the employer wedge za for women (men).
Proof. See Appendix C.2.4.
Lemma 4 extends the comparative statics results with respect to wages in Mortensen (2003) to
an environment with richer employment contracts (amenities and wages, instead of just wages) and
richer sources of worker mobility (Godfather shocks and heterogeneous arrival rates from nonem-
ployment and employment, instead of just homogeneous arrival rates). Intuitively, firms with a larger
payoff from employing a given worker optimally offer workers higher utility through wages in order
to attract and retain a larger workforce.
Lemma 5 (Optimal employment). A firm’s optimal employment l∗a,g(·) is strictly increasing in p for all
worker types, strictly decreasing in the vacancy cost shifter cv,0a,g for all worker types, and strictly decreasing
(constant) in the employer wedge za for women (men).
Proof. See Appendix C.2.5.
Lemma 5 states that firms with higher composite productivity p˜ have greater steady-state employ-
ment, which is a combination of their rank in the job ladder, as guided by their flow-utility rank, and
their recruitment intensity, as guided by the share of their aggregate-share of vacancies.
4.7 EquilibriumWage Equation
The current equilibrium model provides a microfoundation for the decomposition of log wages into
worker FEs and gender-firm FEs by Card et al. (2016), which is based on the seminal two-way FEs
framework developed by AKM. To back up this claim, we provide a set of sufficient conditions for
the log-wage decomposition to obtain as an equilibrium outcome in the model.
Assumption 1 (Vacancy cost function). Vacancy-posting costs cv,0a,g scale linearly in worker ability a:
cv,0a,g = ac
v,0
g , ∀a
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Assumption 1 could reflect that recruiting costs be paid in terms of time given to new hires for
orientation and training, or in terms of the time of equally skilled workers devoted to recruiting.
Assumption 2 (Job offer arrival and separation rates). The relative arrival rates of optional job offers sEa,g,
that of mandatory job offers sGa,g, and separation rates δa,g are constant in worker ability a:
sEa,g = s
E
g , s
G
a,g = s
G
g , δa,g = δg, ∀a
Assumption 2 allows for differential worker mobility across, but not within, genders.
Assumption 3 (Amenity cost function). The amenity creation cost function cpia,g(pi) takes on the following
piece-rate form:
cpia,g(pi) = ac
pi,0
g c˜
(pi
a
)
, ∀a
Assumption 3 states that the cost of creating amenities is proportional to worker ability, and that
amenities are paid to worker as a piece rate in their ability. A natural interpretation for this would be
that some amenities involve time spent off work, such as in the context of paid parental leave. In this
case, the cost of providing some units of time in amenities to a worker scales linearly in the worker’s
ability or forgone production due to the worker’s absence from the job.
Assumption 4 (Flow values of nonemployment and employer wedges). The flow values of nonemploy-
ment ba,g and employer wedges za scale linearly in worker ability a:
ba,g = bga, za = za, ∀a
Assumption 4 ensures symmetry in participation and composite productivity across labor mar-
kets. It may be justified by higher-ability workers also being more skilled at home production, and by
employers being willing to give up a fraction of workers’ output to avoid interacting with them.
The following result links the structural model to the reduced-form approach in Section 3.2.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Wage Equation). Under Assumptions 1–4, the equilibrium wage of a worker
with ability a and gender g at a firm with composite productivity p˜g and amenity cost shifter c
pi,0
g is
lnwa,g
(
p˜g, cpi,0g
)
= αa︸︷︷︸
“worker FE”
+ ψg
(
p˜g, cpi,0g
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
“gender-firm FE”
, (16)
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where
αa = ln a,
ψg
(
p˜g, cpi,0g
)
= ln
 p˜g − pi∗g (cpi,0g )−
p˜gˆ
p˜′≥φg
[1+ κeg [1− Fg (x∗g ( p˜g))]
1+ κeg
[
1− Fg
(
x∗g ( p˜
′)
)] ]2 dp˜′
 . (17)
Proof. See Appendix C.2.6.
Proposition 1 shows that, under appropriate scaling assumptions, equilibriumwages in the model
are log-additive between a worker component (“worker FE”) and a gender-specific firm component
(“gender-specific firm FE”). The worker FE αa is a strictly monotonic transformation of worker ability.
The gender-specific firm FE ψg( p˜g, c
pi,0
g ) depends only on gender-firm–specific parameters, namely a
firm’s composite productivity p˜g and its amenity cost shifter c
pi,0
g . Therefore, the equilibrium model
provides a microfoundation for the wage equation with gender-specific employer pay components
developed by Card et al. (2016) and used in our own empirical investigation. We will maintain As-
sumptions 1–4 and focus on differences in gender-specific firm FEs between men and women for the
remainder of the analysis.
4.8 Discussion of Equilibrium Properties
The above model has three notable equilibrium properties. First, the model can rationalize job-to-
job transitions with wage declines. On one hand, workers receive exogenous relocation shocks that
result in forced transitions from wage w to w′ < w. On the other hand, workers may endogenously
transition from wage-utility combination (w, x) to (w′, x′) with x′ > x but w′ < w.
Second, “discriminatory” firms (as captured by the employer wedge z) can survive in a frictional
environment.21 A prediction of Becker (1971)’s seminal framework of taste-based discrimination is
that, in a competitive market, employers with a distaste for certain workers are driven out of the
market. In contrast, in the current model, firms with nonzero employer wedges z survive in the
presence of labor market frictions.
Third, even “nondiscriminatory” firms (as captured by z) may pay women less due to statistical
discrimination based on gender-specific transition rates, due to compensating differentials, or due to their
21We do not want to claim that the employer wedge z only relates to discrimination. On the contrary, we think of it as
capturing many different mechanisms. Among such mechanisms, taste-based discrimination is of particular interest. All
else being equal, higher taste-based discrimination against female workers is associated with higher values of z.
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equilibrium response to the presence of other discriminatory employers.
4.9 Discussion of Modeling Assumptions
We now turn to a brief discussion of some of the more restrictive modeling assumptions and their im-
plications. A first set of assumptions made in the model is that output is linear within and additively
separable across worker types. These assumptions allow for considerable analytical tractability, but
we argue that they are also in line with our empirical evidence.
That output is linear within worker types is not particularly restrictive since a firm’s net payoff
function is already concave due to the convex vacancy cost. Conceptually, there is no reason not to
simultaneously allow for curvature in the ability-weighted number of workers of each type. However,
if the marginal product of a given worker type were exceedingly high for small numbers of workers—
as would be the case with standard constant-elasticity-of-substitution specifications—then we would
see every firm employing a strictly positive mass of each worker type. This clearly would be at odds
with the presence of single-gender firms in the data.
That output is additively separable across worker types ultimately allows the model to admit a
log-linear wage equation, which is a requirement for us to be able to take the model to the data.
Assuming complementarities between genders would lead to the counterfactual implication that no
single-gender firms could exist. Supporting our assumption, Fukui et al. (2019) find a small crowd-
out between women and men in the U.S. between 1970 and 2016. Therefore, it seems like a natural
starting point to think of men and women as perfect substitutes in production.
A second assumption revolves around labor market segmentation by worker types, which allows
firms to tailor wages, amenities, and vacancies to each market. This assumption considerably simpli-
fies the analysis of the firm’s problem. We argue that the assumption is also reasonable and in line
with salient empirical patterns.
Conceptually, that firms can direct wages and vacancies toward certain worker types may seem
at odds with national nondiscrimination laws. But of course a firm need not publicly post a lower
wage or invest less recruitment effort when hiring workers in order to discriminate. Such differences
may naturally arise in more subtle ways when screening résumés, at the interview stage, and at the
negotiation table (Goldin and Rouse, 2000).
Empirically, there are also good reasons to adopt market segmentation. In particular, we have
solved three “natural” modeling alternatives with clearly counterfactual predictions. A model with
firms offering a single wage for workers of both genders would fail to account for the empirical
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within-firm pay differences documented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.22 A model in which amenities are
shared across workers of both genders within a firm would counterfactually predict no dispersion in
firm ranks conditional on gender-specific pay, which is at odds with Fact 3 from Section 3.5. Models
in which vacancy costs are over the sum of gender-specific vacancies or in which vacancies are not
directed across genders fail to account for the empirical dispersion of female employment shares and
hence the between-employer pay gap in the data.23
A third set of assumptions underlying Proposition 1 allow us tomake significant progress in bring-
ing the model to the data. One may expect that some of these assumptions do not hold exactly in the
data. For example, when labor market parameters differ across ability levels, then the decomposition
in equation (16) will not hold exactly. However, Engbom andMoser (2018) show that an AKMdecom-
position of log wage predicts around 99 percent of the variance of log earnings in data simulated from
a model that allows for flexible variation in labor market parameters across ability types estimated to
the same data from Brazil.
5 Identification Strategy
To bridge the model and the data, we connect key model objects with their empirical counterparts.
Our starting point is the special case of the model characterized in Proposition 1 of Section 4.7. Under
the maintained assumptions, this allows us to pool workers of different ability types in the data and
drop a from all subscripts of this section. We adopt a three-step identification strategy.
5.1 Step 1: Employer Ranks
In the first step, we estimate revealed-preference ranks of employers by gender using the PageRank
index (Page et al., 1998; Sorkin, 2018) described in Section 3.5. This constitutes a set of NM + NF
estimates, where NM and NF are the numbers of establishments hiring men and women, respectively,
in the data. The PageRank index represents the asymptotic share of time a representative worker
(“random surfer”) would spend at a given employer. This notion of employer rank coincides with
that in the structural model of Section 4, in which workers are less likely to endogenously separate
22We solve the model with gender-neutral wage offers later when simulating the effects of an equal-pay policy.
23We solve both of these models in Appendix C.3. The model with directed vacancy posting and a joint cost function
in Appendix C.3.1 predicts that, with the exception of knife-edge cases, there exist no dual-gender firms. The model with
undirected vacancy posting in Appendix C.3.2 predicts that, quantitatively, there is far too little dispersion in female em-
ployment shares compared to the empirical distribution we see in the data. We conclude that the benchmark model with
targeted vacancies and separate cost functions is a good starting point for our investigation.
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from, and more likely to accept offers at, higher-utility employers. In what follows, we conflate ranks
and employer identities by indexing establishments by their rank rg ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Rg}, where 1 is the
lowest and Rg is the highest rank for workers of gender g.
5.2 Step 2: Labor Market Parameters
In the second step, we estimate labor market parameters by combining employer ranks from Step 1
with monthly information on worker flows.24 We seek gender-specific estimates of the cumulative
density function (CDF) of offers Frg, separation rates δg, job–finding rates from nonemployment λ
u
g ,
the relative arrival rate of mandatory on-the-job offers sGg , and relative arrival rates of voluntary on-
the-job offers seg. This constitutes a set of NM +NF + 8 parameters. To this end, we exploit the model’s
job-ladder property that worker transitions depend only on ordinal employer ranks.
Job offer distributions. After ordering employers by their revealed-preference rank r, we compute
the share of hires from nonemployment of each employer j out of total hires from nonemployment to
estimate the gender-specific offer CDF Frg = Fg(x
r
g).
Exogenous separation rates. We identify δg off separation rates into nonemployment:
δ̂i = Ei1
[
nonemployedi,t+1
∣∣∣ employedi,t, genderi = g] .
Offer rates from nonemployment. We identify λug off a log-hazard model for the time it takes for a
worker to return to the data from nonemployment:
λ̂ug = 1− exp
(
ln (Ei1 [nonemployment durationi ≥ t| genderi = g])
t
)
.
Mandatory on-the-job offer rates. Two insights allow us to identify λGg using information onworker
transitions between employers. First, we focus on transitions in rank, not pay, space. Second, the share
of rank-increasing transitions due to mandatory on-the-job offers declines in Frg. Formally, the total
24The high-frequency nature of our data allows us obtain more precise estimates of employer ranks than has been possible
in previous work. For example, Sorkin (2018) uses quarterly data to compute employer ranks based on what is effectively
annual information on employment spells. We find that time aggregation bias (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2018) can be
substantial when repeating our estimates using aggregated data at the quarterly or annual level.
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number of job-to-job transitions from employer rank r is
J2Jrg = n
r
g[λ
e
g(1− F
r
g) + λ
G
g ], (18)
where nrg is the number of workers of gender g at r. Rearranging and taking expectations, we have
λ̂Gg = Ei
[
J2Jr↓g
nrg F̂
r
g
]
,
where J2Jr↓g = J2Jrg − n
r
g(λ
e
g + λ
G
g )(1− F
r
g) is the number of job-to-job transitions to lower ranks.
Voluntary on-the-job offer rates. On-the-job offers not associated with mandatory transitions must
have been voluntary. Hence, once we know λGg , we can use equation (18) to estimate λ
e
g as
λ̂eg =
J2Jrg/n
r
g − λ̂
G
g
1− F̂rg
.
5.3 Step 3: Employer-Level Parameters and Values of Nonemployment
In the third step, we estimate employer-level parameters—productivity, amenity cost shifters, em-
ployer wedges, and vacancy cost shifters—together with workers’ flow values of nonemployment
using information on gender-specific employer ranks, pay, and labor market parameters. This consti-
tutes a set of 3(NM + NF) + 2 parameters. The insight that amenity values act as a residual between
employers’ rank and pay allows us to set-identify amenity values for each employer.25 We further
narrow the identified amenity sets using equilibrium restrictions from the structural model. Within
the narrowed set of amenities, we pick theminimal amenity values needed to rationalize the empirical
employer rank-pay distribution. Appendix D.1 presents an illustrative example of the identification
routine with three employers. We now delineate the general case.
Using Lemma 1, we can search for amenity values rather than amenity cost shifters, since the two
are isomorphic. Given wages (w1g,w
2
g, . . . ,w
Rg
g ) ∈ R
Rg
++, the problem is to find separately by gender g
a vector of amenity values (pi1g,pi
2
g, . . . ,pi
Rg
g ) ∈ R
Rg
+ subject to a sequence of flow-utility monotonicity
25The reason for set identification (as opposed to point identification) is that it is impossible to deduce cardinal utility
measures from just ordinal employer rank and pay information absent additional strong restrictions on the environment.
For example, the utility offered by the highest-ranked employer can be bounded from below because it must exceed that of
the second-highest-ranked employer, but it cannot be bounded from above.
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constraints dictated by Lemma 4:
wrg + pi
r
g ≤ w
r+1
g + pi
r+1
g , ∀r < Rg. (19)
In partial equilibrium, one would pick an amenity vector from the identified set, for example by
minimizing the sum of squared differences between rank-adjacent utilities defined as26
∑
r
[(
wr+1g + pi
r+1
g
)
−
(
wrg + pi
r
g
)]2
. (20)
However, in general equilibriumwe can do better by taking into account additional model restric-
tions on the amenity vector imposed by Lemma 4:
p˜rg ≤ p˜
r+1
g , ∀r < Rg. (21)
Rewriting firms’ first-order condition (FOC) with respect to flow utility x in equation (15) yields27
p˜r = wrg + pi
r
g +
1+ κeg(1− Fg(x
r
g))
2κeg fg(xrg)
. (22)
To summarize, given wages (w1g,w
2
g, . . . ,w
Rg
g ), estimates of the offer distribution F̂rg, and estimates
of labormarket parameters κ̂eg, we find gender-specific amenity values (pi
1
g,pi
2
g, . . . ,pi
Rg
g ) that minimize
equation (20) subject to the constraints in equations (19), (21), and (22):
(pi1g,pi
2
g, . . . ,pi
Rg
g ) = argmin
(pi1g,pi2g,...,pi
Rg
g )∈R
Rg
+
∑
r
[(
wr+1g + pi
r+1
g
)
−
(
wrg + pi
r
g
)]2
(23)
s.t. wrg + pi
r
g ≤ w
r+1
g + pi
r+1
g , ∀r < Rg
wrg + pi
r
g +
1+ κ̂eg(1− F̂
r
g)
2κ̂eg f̂ rg
≤ wr+1g + pi
r+1
g +
1+ κ̂eg(1− F̂
r+1
g )
2κ̂eg f̂
r+1
g
, ∀r < Rg.
Given amenity estimates, we back out amenity cost shifters {ĉpi,0,rg } given the functional form of
the amenity cost function c˜(·). Next, we combine estimates of amenity values, wages, and labor mar-
ket parameters to back out composite productivites using equation (22). The definition of composite
productivity for men yields employer productivity p̂r = ̂˜prM − pirM + cpi,rM (pirM). For dual-gender em-
26We tried several alternative ways of choosing amenities from the identified set in Monte Carlo simulations and found
that choosing the utility-distance-minimizing performed best across different data generating processes.
27See Appendix D.2 for further details on the change of variables from x to r.
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ployers, we can estimate the employer wedge as zr = p̂r − ̂˜prF + pirF − cpi,rF (pirF). By the definition of the
offer distribution, vrg = f
r
gVg. Rearranging the FOCs for optimal vacancies {v
r
g}r, we estimate vacancy
cost shifters as
ĉv,0,rg =
Tg(̂˜prg − x̂rg) (δ̂g + λ̂Gg + λ̂eg(1− F̂rg))−2
∂c˜v( f̂ rgVg)/∂vrg
, ∀r, (24)
where x̂rg = ŵ
r
g + pi
r
g and Tg = µg[(ug + s
G
g )λ
u
g(δg + λ
G
g + λ
e
g)]/Vg. Equation (24) relates the vacancy
cost shifter cv,0,rg to the aggregate mass of vacancies Vg. Given that the latter is of no independent
interest and the invariance of all else, we normalize Vg = 1. Finally, gender-specific outside option
values are estimated as φ̂g = minr {wrg + pi
r
g}. Together with a value of the exogenous discount rate
ρ, equation (7) yields estimates of the gender-specific flow values of nonemployment, b̂g.
To summarize, we have estimated amenity and vacancy cost shifters {ĉpi,0,rg , ĉ
pi,0,r
g }r for each gen-
der at every employer, productivities and employer wedges { p̂r, ẑr}r for dual-gender firms, a set of
productivities { p̂r}r for firms employing only men, a set of female composite productivites {̂˜prF}r for
firms employing only women, and gender-specific flow values of nonemployment b̂g.
Two final comments are in order. First, although we estimate relative amenity values across em-
ployers, we are unable to identify the mean of amenities, and hence the level of utility, for either
gender. The reason is, simply, the invariance of revealed preferences to a level shift in utilities. Thus,
we normalize amenities to be weakly positive for both genders. Second, we can obviously not identify
parameters relating both genders within an employer that hires workers of only one gender. We still
use single-gender employers in the estimation, since they add to the identification of all other param-
eters. We assume that the parameters of single-gender employers with no workers of gender g are
such that their composite productivity falls short of the outside option value for that gender, p˜g < φg.
We keep these employers unchanged in counterfactuals involving gender-specific parameters.28
6 Estimation Results
6.1 Exogenous Parameters and Functional Form Assumptions
We assume that the cost functions for amenities and vacancies are of the power form, c˜pig (pi) = pi
ηpi/ηpi
with ηpi = 2 and c˜vg(v) = v
ηv/ηv with ηv = 2. Neither of these assumptions is relevant for model fit
as we can match the distributions of pirg and f
r
g establishment by establishment in the data regardless
28We have repeated all of our results for the subset of dual-gender employers.
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of functional forms or parameter values.29 Finally, we assume a discount factor of ρ = 0.051, which
corresponds to an annual compound real interest rate of 5.3 percent. See Table 3.
Table 3. Exogenous parameters
Parameter Description Value
ηpi Amenity cost elasticity 2
ηv Vacancy cost elasticity 2
ρ Discount rate 0.051
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: Parameter values are externally set and treated as fixed.
6.2 Labor Market Parameters and Flow Values of Nonemployment
Estimated labor market parameters are shown in Table 4. Women exhibit lower transition rates in
general, both between employment states and between jobs. The implied nonemployment rates are
uM = 0.243 and uF = 0.244, reflecting the presence of a large informal sector in Brazil, but similar
across genders. While women are more likely to be permanently employed in the informal sector,
men and women are similarly attached to the formal sector conditional on ever participating. For
both men and women, mandatory on-the-job offers are about twice as frequent as voluntary ones.
Finally, the flow value of nonemployment is higher for men than for women.
Table 4. Job offer arrival rates, job destruction rates, and flow values of nonemployment
Parameter Description Value Implied rate
λuM Offer arrival rate from nonemployment (M) 0.100 0.100
λuF Offer arrival rate from nonemployment (F) 0.087 0.087
δM Job destruction rate (M) 0.036 0.036
δF Job destruction rate (F) 0.031 0.031
seM Relative arrival rate of voluntary on-the-job offers (M) 0.057 0.006
seF Relative arrival rate of voluntary on-the-job offers (F) 0.061 0.005
sGM Relative arrival rate of mandatory on-the-job offers (M) 0.119 0.012
sGF Relative arrival rate of mandatory on-the-job offers (F) 0.107 0.009
bM Flow value of nonemployment (M) 1.357
bF Flow value of nonemployment (F) 1.267
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: “M” denotes parameter for men, “F” denotes parameter for
women. Implied rates are monthly.
29We have experimented with different elasticities of the amenity cost and vacancy cost functions for counterfactuals.
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6.3 Distributions of Productivity, Amenities, and Employer Wedges
Figure 7 shows the marginal distributions of estimated productivity, amenity values, and employer
wedges. Productivity dispersion is substantially larger than that in amenities or employer wedges.
Productivity and employer wedges are positively skewed. Male and female amenities are similarly
dispersed, left-skewed, and have thinner tails than a normal distribution.
Figure 7. Marginal distributions of estimated employer parameters
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: Figure shows demeanedmarginal distributions of estimated
productivity (p), gender-specific amenity values (pig), and employer wedges (z).
Table 5 reports employment-weighted pairwise correlations between gender-specific pay (ψg),
gender-specific PageRanks (rg), productivity (p), gender-specific amenity values (pig), employerwedges
(z), and vacancy cost shifters (cv,0g ).30 A few points are worth noting. First, we find strong positive cor-
relations between pay (0.900), ranks (0.651), amenities (0.662), and vacancy costs (0.672) within em-
ployers across genders, indicating establishment-specific factors shared by men and women. Second,
productivity is strongly positively correlated with ranks for men (0.847) but less so for women (0.586).
This is because productivity is similarly positively correlated with pay for men (0.546) and women
(0.582), but more positively correlated with amenities for men (0.556) than for women (0.247). In con-
trast, benchmark job-ladder models à la Burdett andMortensen (1998) predict that productivity ranks
are perfectly positively correlated with pay ranks. Third, the correlation between pay and ranks is
more positive for men (0.414) than for women (0.349), while that between amenities and ranks is less
positive for women (0.666) than for men (0.602). Fourth, amenities are similarly negatively correlated
30In Appendix E.1, we report for robustness the relation between our estimates using PageRanks and analogous esti-
mates using the poaching rank (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2008; Bagger and Lentz, 2018) and the net poaching rank
(Haltiwanger et al., 2018; Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2018).
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to pay for men (−0.331) and for women (−0.343), suggesting compensating differentials for both gen-
ders. Finally, employer wedges are correlated positively with ranks for men (0.376) but negatively for
women (−0.281), and correlated positively with productivity (0.507). This is consistent with Becker
(1971)’s idea that taste-based discrimination cannot survive among employers with close-to-zero eco-
nomic profits.
Table 5. Correlation table for estimated employer parameters
ψM ψF rM rF p piM piF z c
v,0
M c
v,0
F
ψM 1.000
ψF 0.900 1.000
rM 0.414 0.428 1.000
rF 0.277 0.349 0.651 1.000
p 0.546 0.582 0.847 0.586 1.000
piM −0.331 −0.245 0.602 0.420 0.556 1.000
piF −0.341 −0.343 0.332 0.666 0.247 0.662 1.000
z 0.363 0.238 0.376 −0.281 0.507 0.183 −0.403 1.000
cv,0M 0.219 0.214 −0.170 −0.031 −0.174 −0.425 −0.226 −0.208 1.000
cv,0F 0.361 0.334 0.025 −0.069 0.016 −0.340 −0.399 0.144 0.672 1.000
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: Table reports employment-weighted pairwise correlations
between gender-specific pay (ψg), gender-specific PageRanks (rg), productivity (p), gender-specific amenity
values (pig), employer wedges (z), and vacancy cost shifters (c
v,0
g ) across employers.
6.4 Relating Amenity Estimates to Observable Employer Characteristics
Our amenity estimates are residuals that rationalize employer ranks given their pay. To find out what
economic factors these residuals capture, we relate our amenity estimates to a rich set of employer
characteristics not used in the estimation through the following regression:
pig,j = Eg,jηg + ιg,j, (25)
where pig,j is the estimated amenity value for employer j, Eg,j is a vector of employer covariates, and
ιg,j is an error term. We include as covariates in Eg,j twelve variables, which we construct using the
RAIS data—see Appendix E.2 for details.
Results from estimating equation (25) are presented in Table 6.31 Reassuringly, unmeasured in-
come in the form of food stamps loads similarly positively onto men’s and women’s amenity values.
Both genders value positively a number of employer amenities related to job flexibility and paid
31Results shown here are for all (dual- and single-gender) employers. For robustness, we have repeated the analysis for
only dual-gender employers.
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leave. Both value negatively attributes related to earnings fluctuations, workplace conflict (as proxied
by the share of unjust firings), and workplace risk (as proxied by worker death rates). Compared to
men, women put relatively greater value on employer amenities such as hours flexibility and parental
leave.32 Women put relatively greater negative value on employer disamenities such as unpaid leave,
earnings risk, and workplace risk. Altogether, we explain around 32 percent of the variation in esti-
mated amenities for men and 47 percent of the variation for women.
Table 6. Regression of estimated amenity values on employer characteristics, by gender
Men Women
Indicator: employer provides food stamps 0.089*** (0.000) 0.083*** (0.000)
Share of workers with part-time contract 0.033*** (0.000) 0.096*** (0.000)
Share of workers with hours change since previous year 0.034*** (0.001) 0.123*** (0.001)
Share of workers with paid sick leave 0.175*** (0.001) 0.144*** (0.001)
Share of workers with parental leave −4.969*** (0.036) 0.065*** (0.005)
Share of workers with unpaid leave −0.085*** (0.004) −0.125*** (0.005)
Share of workers with earnings cut since previous year −0.165*** (0.001) −0.219*** (0.001)
Share of workers with noncontractual earnings fluctuations −0.045*** (0.001) −0.218*** (0.001)
Share of workers with work-related accident −0.334*** (0.007) −0.534*** (0.012)
Share of workers with commute-related accident −0.792*** (0.026) −0.311*** (0.044)
Share of worker separations due to firing for unjust reasons −0.162*** (0.000) −0.188*** (0.000)
Share of worker separations due to worker death −0.627*** (0.003) −0.786*** (0.004)
Industry FEs X X
Municipality FEs X X
Number of unique establishments 272,549 168,862
Observations 17,407,809 9,760,711
R2 0.320 0.471
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels.
6.5 Relating Employer Wedge Estimates to Observable Employer Characteristics
Analogous to our analysis of amenities, our employer wedge estimates are residuals that rationalize
equilibrium pay for men and women within an employer. Such employer wedges could capture
taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1971) or employer-level comparative advantages across genders
(Goldin, 1992). To unpack this black box, we relate our employer wedge estimates to a rich set of
employer characteristics not used in the estimation through the following regression:
ẑj = Ejη + ιj, (26)
32Parental leave may be costly to coworkers who increase working hours to make up for the temporary absence of a
parent (Gallen, 2020; Brenøe et al., 2019; Ginja et al., 2020). While we find a large negative coefficient on parental leave
incidence for men, men are empirically two orders of magnitude less likely to ever take parental leave compared to women.
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where ẑj is the estimated employer wedge for establishment j, Ej is a vector of employer covariates,
and ιj is an error term. We include as covariates in Ej twelve variables, which we construct using the
RAIS data—see Appendix E.2 for details.
Results from estimating equation (25) are presented in Table 7. We group the independent vari-
ables into two categories. The first group pertains to proxies for employer-level comparative ad-
vantages across genders. It includes task content measures and proxies for risks of physical harm
and strength requirements. Our results indicate mixed support for the employer-level-comparative-
advantage story. On one hand, we find that employer wedges are positively related to nonroutine
manual task intensity and the share of workers with work-related accidents, suggesting that women
are perceived as less productive in physical and risky jobs.33 On the other hand, we find that em-
ployer wedges are negatively related to routine manual task intensity and the share of worker separa-
tions due to worker death, suggesting that women are not perceived as less productive in physically
demanding jobs.34 All results are robust across specifications with cumulatively added controls for
employers’ industry and municipality, which may themselves be correlated with gender-based com-
parative advantage.
The second group pertains to proxies for taste-based discrimination. It includes measures of gen-
der composition and a measure of financial independence. Our results lend support to the inter-
pretation of employer wedges as being related to taste-based discrimination. Employer wedges are
strongly negatively related to the female employment share, consistent with more female-friendly
workplaces attracting and retaining more female workers. Similarly, establishments with a woman in
the highest-paid position on average have a lower employer wedge, suggesting that female mentors
may affect the female-friendliness of a workplace. Finally, small firms with little financial depen-
dence on average have a significantly higher wedge, possibly due to discrimination being more likely
to survive under lower accountability to investors and other stakeholders. Results are robust across
different sets of controls.
Overall, while we cannot definitively pin down the factors behind the intra-employer wedge, our
analysis sheds light on proxies related to potential economic explanations. Altogether, we explain
around 76 percent of the variation in estimated employer wedges. Most of this variation is due to
variables related to gender-based comparative advantage and taste-based discrimination rather than
33Nonroutine manual tasks include jobs that are physical but involve a wide set of tasks and are not rule-based, such as
“janitor, home health aide, and personal care aide.” (Siu and Jaimovich, 2015).
34Routine manual tasks include “jobs that are both rule based and emphasize physical [...] tasks,” such as “factory workers
who operate welding, fitting, and metal press machines [and] forklift operators.” (Siu and Jaimovich, 2015).
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Table 7. Regression of estimated employer wedges on empl. characteristics, by gender
(1) (2) (3)
Routine manual task intensity −0.107*** (0.000) −0.059*** (0.001) −0.057*** (0.001)
Nonroutine manual task intensity 0.278*** (0.001) 0.176*** (0.001) 0.155*** (0.001)
Routine cognitive task intensity −0.013*** (0.000) −0.005*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001)
Nonroutine cognitive interpersonal task intensity −0.123*** (0.001) −0.029*** (0.001) −0.030*** (0.001)
Nonroutine cognitive analytical task intensity 0.089*** (0.001) 0.055*** (0.001) 0.034*** (0.001)
Share of worker separations due to worker death −0.753*** (0.005) −0.471*** (0.005) −0.395*** (0.006)
Share of workers with work-related accidents 2.229*** (0.021) 1.500*** (0.021) 0.295*** (0.020)
Female employment share −4.206*** (0.001) −3.645*** (0.001) −3.835*** (0.001)
Indicator: highest-paid worker is a woman −0.239*** (0.001) −0.166*** (0.001) −0.121*** (0.001)
Indicator: no major financial stakeholders 0.048*** (0.001) 0.031*** (0.001) 0.034*** (0.001)
Industry FEs X X
Municipality FEs X
Number of unique establishments 96,065 96,065 96,065
Observations 17,287,101 17,287,101 17,287,101
R2 0.693 0.730 0.764
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels.
due to the inclusion of controls for industry andmunicipality. Thus, while our findings are suggestive
of some economic explanations behind the estimated employer wedges, they also leave room for other
factors.
6.6 Model Fit
We solve for the equilibrium of themodel given the above parameter estimates. We first use themodel
to match exactly, employer by employer, the empirical offer distribution of pay and amenities Frg. We
then ask the model to predict the cross-sectional equilibrium pay and amenity distribution, which we
compare to the data.35 Table 8 shows the model fit vis-à-vis a set of salient empirical moments. We
find that the model fits the data well. The model somewhat understates the magnitude of the gender
pay gap and the variance of employer pay compared to the data. The model closely matches the
empirical variance of the gender pay gap, empirical job-to-job transition rates for both genders, and
the correlation between men’s and women’s pay within employers.
35The numerical solution algorithm we use is discussed in Appendix E.4.
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Table 8. Model fit
Moment Description Data Model
E [ψM − ψF] Gender pay gap 0.084 0.074
E
[
ψF
∣∣ g = M]−E [ψF∣∣ g = F] Gender pay gap between employers 0.074 0.055
E
[
ψM − ψF
∣∣ g = F] Gender pay gap within employers 0.009 0.018
Var(ψM) Variance of men’s pay 0.051 0.040
Var(ψF) Variance of women’s pay 0.046 0.032
Var(ψM − ψF) Variance of gender pay gap 0.010 0.009
E
[
λeM (1− F (x)) + λ
G
M
]
Job-to-job transition rate for men 0.016 0.015
E
[
λeF (1− F (x)) + λ
G
F
]
Job-to-job transition rate for women 0.012 0.012
Corr(ψM,ψF) Correlation between men’s and women’s pay 0.926 0.932
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Rates are monthly.
7 Equilibrium Counterfactuals
7.1 Sources of the Gender Pay Gap
With the estimated model in hand, we recompute equilibria while shutting down various gender
differences. We consider four counterfactuals. First, we set the amenity cost shifters of women equal
to those of men, cpi,0F = c
pi,0
M .
36 Second, we shut down employer wedges, z = 0. Third, we only shut
down differences in vacancy creation cost shifters cv,0g across genders. Fourth and finally, we shut
down all of the above gender differences simultaneously.37 Table 9 describes our baseline economy
(column 0) and results from the four counterfactuals (columns 1–4).
Counterfactual 1: Shutting down gender differences in amenity costs. Gender differences in ameni-
ties account for around 1.3 log points (18 percent) of the gender gap. Worker welfare increases by 0.5
percent in payroll-equivalent units. The increase in pay for women (Panel (a) of Figure 8) is partly off-
set by a corresponding decrease in mean amenity values (Panel (b)). Output increases slightly because
high-productivity firms increase their amenities, thus attracting more women. As a consequence, pay
inequality for women increases. However, employer welfare decreases: profits decline because firms
now pay higher wages, andwedges increase because more womenwork at high-wedge firms. Finally,
women’s employer rank-pay rank relationship becomes steeper (Panel (c)), becoming more like that
of men documented in Section 3.5. See column 1 of Table 9.
36For robustness, we have simulated counterfactuals under a range of amenity cost elasticities. In Appendix F, we show
a variant of the counterfactuals with exogenous amenities, i.e., ηpi = ∞. Our insights remain substantially unchanged.
37In all counterfactuals but the last, we keep single-gender employers unchanged. Single-gender employers are impor-
tant because they make up a significant share of all employers and mediate the response of other firms to counterfactual
parameter changes. For the gender-neutral economy, we set previously men-only firms to hire women in equal proportions,
while previously women-only firms cease to exist. In essence, the gender-neutral economy is an economy that consists of
two copies of the current market for men.
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Table 9. Results from simulating equilibrium counterfactuals
Baseline Counterfactuals
Gender differences in... (0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
amenities X X X
employer wedges X X X
vacancy posting costs X X X
Gender pay gap... 0.074 0.061 0.020 0.018 0.000
between employers 0.055 0.056 0.047 0.016 0.000
within employers 0.018 0.005 −0.026 0.002 0.000
Output 1.000 1.001 1.012 1.033 1.035
Worker welfare from... 0.000 0.004 0.015 −0.004 0.027
payroll for women 0.000 0.010 0.026 0.019 0.029
amenity value for women 0.000 −0.006 −0.010 −0.022 −0.002
Payroll-equivalent welfare change 0.000 0.005 0.019 −0.004 0.033
Employer welfare from... 1.000 0.997 1.011 0.986 1.039
profits 1.004 1.002 1.011 1.039 1.039
employer wedges −0.004 −0.006 0.000 −0.053 0.000
Total employment for women 0.760 0.759 0.762 0.760 0.757
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: Table reports simulation results from model-based coun-
terfactuals. Baseline results (column 0) are compared against counterfactuals without gender differences in
amenities (column 1), in employer wedges (column 2), in vacancy posting costs (column 3), and without any
gender differences (column 4).
Figure 8. Effects of counterfactual 1 on amenities and pay for women
(a) Pay distribution
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(b) Amenities distribution
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(c) Employer rank vs. pay rank
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: Counterfactual corresponding to column 1 of Table 9.
Counterfactual 2: Shutting down employer wedges. Employer wedges account for around 5.4 log
points (73 percent) of the gender gap. Most of the decrease in the gender gap is within firms, but the
between-firm gap also decreases due to equilibrium reallocation of women. The mean and dispersion
of women’s wages increase (Panel (a) of Figure 9). Since wedges were positively correlated with
productivity, removing them increases women’s dispersion in composite productivity and hence pay.
Output increases by 1.2 percent, worker welfare by 1.9 percent, and profits by 0.7 percent. Output
increases due to women relocating to high-productivity, formerly high-wedge firms. The increase in
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worker welfare is accounted for by a large rise in women’s payroll and partly offset by a decline in
amenity values due to worker relocation (Panel (b)). That employer profits also increase reflects the
fact that employers with a nonzero wedge were not maximizing monetary profits. Another result is
a steepening of the productivity-pay relationship for women (Panel (c)) that resembles an increase in
women’s “bargaining power” (Card et al., 2016). See column 2 of Table 9.
Figure 9. Effects of counterfactual 2 on pay, amenities and offer distribution for women
(a) Pay distribution
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(b) Amenities distribution
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: Counterfactual corresponding to column 2 of Table 9.
Counterfactual 3: Shutting down gender differences in vacancy costs. Gender differences in va-
cancy costs account for around 5.6 log points (76 percent) of the gender gap. Again, most of this
decline is explained by a decline in the between-employer pay gap. More women become employed
at high-paying firms (Panel (a) of Figure 10). There is a significant increase in output of around 3.3
percent due to the relocation of women to more productive firms (Panel (c)). However, the impact on
worker welfare is net negative, around 0.4 percent. The reason for this is that especially high-wedge,
high-productivity, but low-amenity employers increase their employment of women (Panel (c)). This
also means that in spite of an increase in monetary profits of around 3.5 percent, employers are worse
off on average. A key takeaway from this simulation is that gender differences in employer allocation
are not necessarily inefficient. See column 3 of Table 9.
Counterfactual 4: Moving to a gender-neutral economy. By construction, moving to a gender-
neutral economy eliminates the gender gap. Put differently, women’s mean pay increases by 7.4
percent. Interestingly, this is also associated with large gains in output (3.5 percent), worker wel-
fare (3.3 percent), and employer welfare (3.9 percent). Output increases because women relocate to
higher-productivity employers. Most of the increase in worker welfare is due to an increase in pay,
not amenities. Additionally, employer welfare increases due to a combination of higher profits and
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Figure 10. Effects of counterfactual 3 on the distribution of women’s employment.
(a) Women’s distribution over pay
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: Counterfactual corresponding to column 3 of Table 9.
lower wedges. See column 4 of Table 9.
Interaction effects and the distinction between output versus welfare. One important insight from
our simulations is that the different structural gender differences interact nonlinearly. While removing
all gender differences simultaneously leads to large output and welfare gains, addressing only one at
a time may actually result in welfare losses. Another important insight is that output and welfare are
fundamentally different, and that the two can move in opposite directions.
7.2 The (Unintended) Consequences of an Equal-Pay Policy
The salient gender gap suggests an interesting thought experiment: What would be the effects of a
mandated equal-pay policy that requires men and women of identical ability to be paid the same
within employers? We implement this experiment within our model as follows: firms may choose
only one wage, which must be paid to both men and women, while still being allowed to produce
gender-specific amenities and post different amounts of vacancies for men and women.
We summarize the effects of the equal-pay policy in Table 10.38 By construction, the within-
employer gender pay gap disappears under the policy. More surprisingly, the between-employer
gender gap actually increases by 0.2 log points. This happens because firms with positive wedges
find it especially costly to pay a single wage to workers of both genders. Consequently, they hire rel-
atively fewer women. Because employer wedges are higher at high-productivity firms, the equal-pay
policy reduces women’s employment at relatively high-paying firms, thereby increasing the between-
employer gap.
38The numerical solution algorithm used to solve for the equilibrium under the equal-pay policy departs significantly
from that used for the previous results and is detailed in Appendix F.1.
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The policy also has subtle redistributive effects. The policy is associated with a significant increase
in pay for women of 1.5 log points. At the same time, men’s pay and employment each decrease by
0.2 log points. Men lose relatively less pay than women gain, but experience higher unemployment
because of men’s relatively higher outside option value. In addition, employers compensate a sub-
stantial share of the pay changes for each gender with changes in amenities in the opposite directions.
On aggregate, the equal-pay policy has little effect on output and welfare. Worker welfare slightly
increases, as the increase in women’s payroll exceeds the decreases in women’s amenities and men’s
payroll net of amenities. Employer welfare slightly decreases, mostly due to an increase in the mean
employer wedge. A key takeaway is that the (unintended) consequences of forcing equal pay on
employers are quite different from moving to a gender-neutral economy.
Table 10. Results from simulating effects of an equal-pay policy
Baseline Equal-pay policy
(0) (1)
Mean pay for men 1.000 0.998
Mean pay for women 1.000 1.015
Gender pay gap... 0.074 0.057
between employers 0.055 0.057
within employers 0.018 0.000
Output 1.000 1.000
Worker welfare from... 0.000 0.000
total payroll... 0.000 0.001
for men 0.000 −0.001
for women 0.000 0.003
total amenity value... 0.000 −0.001
for men 0.000 0.001
for women 0.000 −0.002
Payroll-equivalent welfare change 0.000 0.001
Employer welfare from... 1.000 0.999
profits 1.004 1.004
employer wedges −0.004 −0.005
Total employment for men 0.757 0.755
Total employment for women 0.760 0.760
Note: Table reports simulation results of an equal-pay policy. Baseline results (column 0) are compared against
the economy under an equal-pay policy (column 1).
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8 Conclusion
Our analysis sheds light on the sources and consequences of the gender pay gap. We document that
a large share of the gender pay gap in Brazil is accounted for by women working at lower-paying
employers compared to men. At the same time, pay is not the sole determinant of workers’ revealed-
preference rankings of employers. We find significant differences in employer pay and ranks across
genders. To interpret these facts, we develop an empirical equilibrium search model that can ratio-
nalize the gender differences in pay and revealed-preference ranks in the data. We use the estimated
model to simulate a series of equilibrium counterfactuals.
The fact that women are paid less than men may or may not reflect output and welfare losses,
depending on the microstructure of their labor markets. In our specific context, we demonstrate
that some ways of closing the gender gap can increase utility for women, while others leave women
worse off. This does not mean that gender gaps can be ignored. We find that there are both output
and welfare gains from moving to a gender-neutral economy, reflecting the current misallocation of
talent across genders (Hsieh et al., 2019). Nevertheless, achieving a gender-neutral economy may not
be an easy task. Our counterfactual simulations suggest that an equal-pay policy fails to close the
gender pay gap, though it has redistributive effects.
Our work opens up several avenues for future research. We have been mostly agnostic about the
factors underlying gender differences in various labormarket margins. Additional evidence is needed
to shed light on these margins and help address them with policies. The applicability of our frame-
work is not limited to gender; the theoretical framework and estimation routine we develop can be
used to assess other dimensions of inequality such as race, cohort, or educational background. Prefer-
ence heterogeneity may exist not only across gender but also across other population subgroups. By
allowing for separate job ladders for men and women, our work takes but a first step in the direction
of integrating richer heterogeneity in models of the labor market.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Comparison of Actual versus Potential Experience
Figure 11. Percentiles of actual experience conditional on potential experience
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Note: Actual experience is constructed from panel data for 1985–2014. We compute potential experience =
age− years of education+ 6. Source: RAIS.
A.2 Summary Statistics
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Table 11. Summary statistics after sample selection and restriction to connected set
2007 2014 Pooled 2007–2014
Overall Men Women Overall Men Women Overall Men Women
Share nonwhite 0.355 0.385 0.305 0.407 0.438 0.360 0.384 0.416 0.333
Share primary school 0.113 0.146 0.057 0.073 0.097 0.037 0.092 0.121 0.045
Share middle school 0.220 0.264 0.146 0.186 0.226 0.126 0.204 0.246 0.136
Share high school 0.475 0.460 0.500 0.554 0.548 0.563 0.520 0.508 0.540
Share college 0.192 0.130 0.296 0.186 0.129 0.274 0.183 0.125 0.278
Mean years of education 10.8 10.1 12.0 11.3 10.7 12.1 11.0 10.4 12.1
(std. dev.) (3.5) (3.5) (3.2) (3.1) (3.2) (2.8) (3.3) (3.4) (3.0)
Mean age 33.5 33.2 34.0 34.5 34.3 34.9 33.9 33.6 34.2
(std. dev.) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5)
Mean establishment size 3,477 1,877 6,179 3,627 2,540 5,284 25,078 14,878 41,728
(std. dev.) (19,946) (12,956) (27,831) (18,287) (13,743) (23,485) (141,762) (97,283) (192,368)
Mean gender-establishment size 2,182 850 4,431 2,267 1,420 3,558 15,542 7,259 29,062
(std. dev.) (12,989) (3,518) (20,607) (11,217) (5,959) (16,144) (88,805) (31,395) (137,318)
Mean establishment age 30.6 27.8 35.5 33.5 30.8 37.7 31.0 28.2 35.6
(std. dev.) (22.5) (21.2) (23.8) (23.6) (22.4) (24.7) (23.1) (21.9) (24.4)
Mean months employed in year 9.9 9.7 10.1 10.1 10.0 10.3 9.9 9.8 10.1
(std. dev.) (3.2) (3.3) (3.2) (3.0) (3.0) (3.0) (3.2) (3.2) (3.1)
Mean contractual work hours 41.3 42.4 39.5 41.3 42.3 39.8 41.5 42.5 39.8
(std. dev.) (5.6) (4.2) (7.1) (5.4) (4.1) (6.6) (5.4) (4.0) (6.7)
Mean tenure (years) 4.3 3.7 5.2 4.4 4.1 4.8 4.1 3.7 4.8
(std. dev.) (6.0) (5.5) (6.6) (6.0) (5.7) (6.4) (5.9) (5.5) (6.4)
Mean log real monthly earnings 7.108 7.156 7.028 7.367 7.430 7.272 7.237 7.291 7.150
(std. dev.) (0.728) (0.732) (0.714) (0.691) (0.692) (0.677) (0.709) (0.712) (0.695)
Mean log real hourly wage 3.402 3.416 3.377 3.659 3.692 3.609 3.525 3.548 3.487
(std. dev.) (0.780) (0.769) (0.797) (0.742) (0.730) (0.757) (0.758) (0.747) (0.774)
Number of worker-years 24,348,192 15,292,100 9,056,092 29,881,399 18,039,128 11,842,271 231,805,831 143,745,869 88,059,962
Number of unique workers 24,348,192 15,292,100 9,056,092 29,881,399 18,039,128 11,842,271 55,078,455 33,197,634 21,880,821
Number of unique establishments 184,168 135,346 48,822 191,504 138,171 53,333 222,695 153,081 69,614
Share female 0.372 0.396 0.380
Mean log gender earnings gap 0.128 0.158 0.141
Mean log gender wage gap 0.039 0.083 0.062
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS.
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Table 12. Summary statistics before sample selection and restriction to connected set
2007 2014 Pooled 2007–2014
Overall Men Women Overall Men Women Overall Men Women
Share nonwhite 0.339 0.368 0.294 0.388 0.416 0.349 0.365 0.394 0.321
Share primary school 0.113 0.149 0.056 0.072 0.099 0.035 0.090 0.122 0.044
Share middle school 0.232 0.278 0.160 0.189 0.233 0.129 0.209 0.255 0.143
Share high school 0.493 0.462 0.543 0.586 0.560 0.621 0.545 0.515 0.588
Share college 0.162 0.111 0.241 0.153 0.108 0.214 0.156 0.109 0.225
Mean years of education 10.7 10.0 11.7 11.1 10.5 11.9 10.9 10.3 11.8
(std. dev.) (3.4) (3.5) (3.0) (3.0) (3.1) (2.6) (3.2) (3.3) (2.8)
Mean age 33.0 33.0 33.0 33.7 33.8 33.7 33.3 33.4 33.3
(std. dev.) (9.5) (9.5) (9.4) (9.5) (9.6) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5)
Mean establishment size 2,137 1,188 3,610 2,055 1,503 2,817 15,300 9,429 23,897
(std. dev.) (15,571) (10,183) (21,317) (13,672) (10,416) (17,144) (110,234) (76,567) (145,728)
Mean gender-establishment size 1,347 542 2,596 1,291 849 1,900 9,522 4,622 16,697
(std. dev.) (10,196) (2,759) (15,843) (8,451) (4,587) (11,839) (69,490) (24,776) (104,473)
Mean establishment age 23.5 22.0 25.8 23.8 22.6 25.6 23.5 22.2 25.4
(std. dev.) (21.3) (19.9) (23.0) (22.3) (21.1) (23.7) (21.8) (20.5) (23.3)
Mean months employed in year 9.6 9.5 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.8 9.6 9.6 9.7
(std. dev.) (3.4) (3.4) (3.4) (3.3) (3.3) (3.3) (3.3) (3.3) (3.4)
Mean contractual work hours 42.0 42.8 40.9 42.1 42.8 41.2 42.1 42.8 41.2
(std. dev.) (5.0) (3.8) (6.2) (4.7) (3.7) (5.7) (4.7) (3.7) (5.8)
Mean tenure (years) 3.8 3.5 4.2 3.6 3.5 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.9
(std. dev.) (5.3) (5.0) (5.7) (5.2) (5.0) (5.4) (5.2) (5.0) (5.5)
Mean log real monthly earnings 6.981 7.034 6.898 7.232 7.299 7.139 7.116 7.176 7.028
(std. dev.) (0.683) (0.692) (0.661) (0.639) (0.648) (0.614) (0.663) (0.673) (0.638)
Mean log real hourly wage 3.254 3.285 3.205 3.501 3.549 3.434 3.385 3.425 3.326
(std. dev.) (0.733) (0.727) (0.739) (0.686) (0.683) (0.685) (0.710) (0.706) (0.710)
Number of worker-years 38,401,131 23,359,048 15,042,083 50,798,080 29,427,684 21,370,396 364,776,727 216,756,022 148,020,705
Number of unique workers 38,401,131 23,359,048 15,042,083 50,798,080 29,427,684 21,370,396 77,297,426 44,401,043 32,896,383
Number of unique establishments 2,716,661 1,664,469 1,052,192 3,583,804 2,062,313 1,521,491 5,927,621 3,329,980 2,597,641
Share female 0.392 0.421 0.406
Mean log gender earnings gap 0.137 0.161 0.148
Mean log gender wage gap 0.080 0.115 0.099
Source: RAIS.
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Table 13. Comparison of summary statistics before and after sample selection and restriction to connected set
Pooled 2007–2014, connected set Pooled 2007–2014, all Ratio: connected set to all
Overall Men Women Overall Men Women Overall Men Women
Share nonwhite 0.384 0.416 0.333 0.365 0.394 0.321 1.052 1.056 1.037
Share primary school 0.092 0.121 0.045 0.090 0.122 0.044 1.022 0.992 1.023
Share middle school 0.204 0.246 0.136 0.209 0.255 0.143 0.976 0.965 0.951
Share high school 0.520 0.508 0.540 0.545 0.515 0.588 0.954 0.986 0.918
Share college 0.183 0.125 0.278 0.156 0.109 0.225 1.173 1.147 1.236
Mean years of education 11.0 10.4 12.1 10.9 10.3 11.8 1.009 1.010 1.025
(std. dev.) (3.3) (3.4) (3.0) (3.2) (3.3) (2.8) 1.031 1.030 1.071
Mean age 33.9 33.6 34.2 33.3 33.4 33.3 1.018 1.006 1.027
(std. dev.) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) 1.000 1.000 1.000
Mean establishment size 25,078 14,878 41,728 15,300 9,429 23,897 1.639 1.578 1.746
(std. dev.) (141,762) (97,283) (192,368) (110,234) (76,567) (145,728) 1.286 1.271 1.320
Mean gender-establishment size 15,542 7,259 29,062 9,522 4,622 16,697 1.632 1.571 1.741
(std. dev.) (88,805) (31,395) (137,318) (69,490) (24,776) (104,473) 1.278 1.267 1.314
Mean establishment age 31.0 28.2 35.6 23.5 22.2 25.4 1.319 1.270 1.402
(std. dev.) (23.1) (21.9) (24.4) (21.8) (20.5) (23.3) 1.060 1.068 1.047
Mean months employed in year 9.9 9.8 10.1 9.6 9.6 9.7 1.031 1.021 1.041
(std. dev.) (3.2) (3.2) (3.1) (3.3) (3.3) (3.4) 0.970 0.970 0.912
Mean contractual work hours 41.5 42.5 39.8 42.1 42.8 41.2 0.986 0.993 0.966
(std. dev.) (5.4) (4.0) (6.7) (4.7) (3.7) (5.8) 1.149 1.081 1.155
Mean tenure (years) 4.1 3.7 4.8 3.6 3.4 3.9 1.139 1.088 1.231
(std. dev.) (5.9) (5.5) (6.4) (5.2) (5.0) (5.5) 1.135 1.100 1.164
Mean log real monthly earnings 7.237 7.291 7.150 7.116 7.176 7.028 1.017 1.016 1.017
(std. dev.) (0.709) (0.712) (0.695) (0.663) (0.673) (0.638) 1.069 1.058 1.089
Mean log real hourly wage 3.525 3.548 3.487 3.385 3.425 3.326 1.041 1.036 1.048
(std. dev.) (0.758) (0.747) (0.774) (0.710) (0.706) (0.710) 1.068 1.058 1.090
Number of worker-years 231,805,831 143,745,869 88,059,962 364,776,727 216,756,022 148,020,705 0.635 0.663 0.595
Number of unique workers 55,078,455 33,197,634 21,880,821 77,297,426 44,401,043 32,896,383 0.713 0.748 0.665
Number of unique establishments 222,695 153,081 69,614 5,927,621 3,329,980 2,597,641 0.038 0.046 0.027
Share female 0.380 0.406 0.936
Mean log gender earnings gap 0.141 0.148 0.953
Mean log gender wage gap 0.062 0.099 0.626
Source: RAIS.
52
B Empirical Appendix
B.1 A Mincerian Approach To Measuring the Gender Gap
As a starting point in our pursuit of understanding the sources of the gender pay gap, we run a series
of classical Mincer regressions without controls for employer identity (Mincer, 1974; Heckman et al.,
2006). The goal is twofold. First, to deliver a set of estimates that are directly comparable to the large
existing literature that has studied gender gaps using household surveys or similar datasets. Second,
to understand the part of the gender gap that is explained byworker and job characteristics associated
with labor supply factors, which we think of as orthogonal to employer characteristics and other labor
demand factors.
A classical Mincerian specification for income (i.e., either earnings or wages) of individual i in
year t, denoted yit, is simply
yit = Xitβ + 1 [genderi = M] α
M + 1 [genderi = F] α
F + ε it, (27)
where Xit is a vector of observable worker and job characteristics discussed below, 1 [genderi = M]
and 1 [genderi = F] are indicator functions that equal 1 if the gender of individual i is male or female,
respetively, and 0 otherwise, αM and αF are gender-specific intercepts, and ε it is a residual term. We
estimate this equation via ordinary least squares (OLS) under the usual strict exogeneity assumption
that E [ε it|Xit, genderi] = 0. The main object of interest resulting from equation (27) is the (conditional)
gender pay gap γ ≡ αM − αF, which captures the mean pay difference between female versus male
workers who are otherwise observationally identical.
Table 14 shows the (conditional) gender gap in four different specifications: the earnings gap
without any controls in column 1; the earnings gap controlling for a linear term in years of education
and a second-order polynomial in actual experience in column 2; the wage gap with the same controls
in column 3; and the earnings gap with an additional set of dummies for education, actual experience,
age, hours, nationality, municipality, industry, occupation, and tenure in column 4.39
Our preferred specification is reported in column 4, with a conditional gender pay gap of around
12 log points. By including a rich set of observable worker and job characteristics as controls, this
specification purges the raw data from various labor supply-related gender differences highlighted
in the previous literature—see, for example, Goldin (2014) and Erosa et al. (2019). This specification
flexibly controls for hours dummies with earnings as the dependent variable. If we restricted hours
to enter linearly with coefficient one in this regression, then this would be identical to using the wage
rate as the dependent variable. More generally, a complete set of hours fixed effects (FEs) controls for
nonconstant wage rates as a function of hours worked. Finally, it is worth noting that our preferred
specification yields a high R2 value of close to 70 percent, which suggests that we are controlling for
a set of gender-pay-relevant characteristics with considerable explanatory power.40
We conclude that a large gender pay gap remains within narrowly defined population subgroups
defined by a rich set of covariates related to labor supply. With a large gap left unexplained by labor
supply, we next turn to factors related to labor demand and ask: what is the role of gender-specific
employer heterogeneity in explaining the gender pay gap?
39Table 15 repeats the same set of mincer reg regressions for the year 2007. Between 2007 and 2014, the raw gender pay
gap (corresponding to column 1 of Table 14) increased by a little less than 3 log points, while the conditional gap with our
full set of controls (corresponding to column 4 of Table 14) shows a decline of a little over 1 log point.
40In univariate regressions and when gradually introducing controls in specification (27), we find that occupation and
hours dummies account for a significant share of empirical pay variation in general and the gender gap in particular.
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Table 14. Estimates from Mincer regressions, 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender gap 0.150 0.246 0.192 0.119
Income concept Earnings Earnings Wage Earnings
Education (linear) X X
Education FEs X
Actual experience (polynomial) X X
Actual experience FEs X
Age FEs X
Contractual work hours FEs X
Nationality FEs X
Municipality FEs X
Industry FEs X
Occupation FEs X
Tenure FEs X
Observations 31,830,960 31,830,960 31,830,960 31,830,960
R2 0.012 0.372 0.389 0.698
Source: RAIS.
Table 15. Estimates from Mincerian regressions, 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender gap 0.125 0.266 0.201 0.132
Income concept Earnings Earnings Wage Earnings
Education (linear) X X
Education FEs X
Actual experience (polynomial) X X
Actual experience FEs X
Age FEs X
Contractual work hours FEs X
Nationality FEs X
Municipality FEs X
Industry FEs X
Occupation FEs X
Tenure FEs X
Observations 25,208,660 25,208,660 25,208,660 25,208,632
R2 0.007 0.367 0.385 0.682
Source: RAIS.
B.2 Robustness for Female Employment Share Distribution
Figure 12 repeats the same histogram of female employment shares shown in Figure 1 for the year
2007, which yields the same qualitative conclusion as before.
Figure 13 splits the histogram shown in Figure 1 into 9 industries, which yields the same qualita-
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Figure 12. Histogram of female employment shares, 2007
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tive conclusion as before.
To show that the unequal distribution of women across employers is robust to different employer
size selection criteria, Figure 14 shows percentiles of the female employment share distribution across
firms for various employment size cutoffs. This addresses the concern that at small firms employment
of women that is representative of the population may not be attainable due to the indivisibility of
bodies in the data. The figure shows that empirically we are quite far away from the equal-allocation
benchmark, even at very large firmswithmore than 10,000 employees. Even among firmswith at least
1,000 employees in the data, the female employment share varies vastly between 5 and 81 percent
going from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile of the female employment share distribution.
B.3 Comparison of Gender-Specific Employment Distributions
To illustrate the nonuniform distribution of women relative to that of men across employers, Figure 15
shows a histogram of male and female employment shares across firms ranked by their employment
of the other gender. If the distribution of women (men) were a symmetric scaled version of that of
men (women), one would see a strictly monotonic increasing density of density bins of one gender
across employment ranks of the other gender. In contrast, the histograms in panels (a)–(d) show
pronounced nonmonotonicities, suggesting that employers that have a relatively large mass of men
do not necessarily also have a relatively large mass of women.
B.4 Gender Segregation Index
To quantify the extent to which women are nonuniformly distributed across employers, we define the
following employer segregation index, St:
St =
∑
Nm+N f
i=1
(
(firm-level female share)J(i,t) − (population female share)
)2
Nm × ((population female share))
2 + N f × (1− (population female share))
2
where i indexes individual workers, Nm and N f are the number of male and female workers, respec-
tively, and J(i, t) is a function that gives the index of the employer of individual i in year t. Note that
the employer segregation index St lies between 0 and 1, with 0 meaning that each employer has a
representative share of women and 1 meaning that all women work at employers where only women
work (and, hence, similarly for men).
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Figure 13. Histogram of female employment shares, by sector
(a) Agriculture & Mining
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(b) Manufacturing
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(c) Utilities
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(d) Construction
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(e) Retail & Wholesale
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(f) FIRE
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(h) Healthcare
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Note: FIRE stands for the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate industry. Source: RAIS.
We find that the employer segregation index, St, takes on a value of 0.349 in 2007. To assess
whether this is an economically meaningful deviation from uniform female shares, note that an index
value of 0.349 corresponds to an equivalent absolute value difference in employer gender shares of
±0.288 around the population female share. In comparison, we find that the same index is signifi-
cantly smaller when computed across industries (0.109), occupations (0.142), or states (0.002) in our
data. Furthermore, the index value is relatively stable when we restrict attention to employers above
minimum size thresholds of between 10 and 1,000 employees.
We conclude that there is a significant amount of gender segregation, with women distributed far
from uniformly across employers.
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Figure 14. Percentiles of female employment share distribution
(a) 2007
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Figure 15. Comparison of gender-specific employment distributions
(a) Male distribution vs. female ranks, 2007
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(b) Male distribution vs. female ranks, 2014
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(c) Female distribution vs. male ranks, 2007
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(d) Female distribution vs. male ranks, 2014
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B.5 Further Details on AKM Estimation Results
Figure 16. Predicted AKM hours fixed effects, by gender
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Note: The omitted category is 1 hour, for which the FE value is normalized to 0. Source: RAIS.
Figure 17. Predicted AKM occupation fixed effects, by gender
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Figure 18. Predicted AKM actual-experience fixed effects, by gender
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Figure 19. Predicted AKM tenure fixed effects, by gender
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Figure 20. Predicted AKM education-year fixed effects, by gender
(a) Men
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(b) Women
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Figure 21. Predicted AKM education-age fixed effects, by gender
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B.6 Further Details on Between vs. Within-Employer Pay Differences
Figure 22. Components of Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions
(a) Decomposition 1: Within-gap using male weights
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(b) Decomposition 1: Between-gap using female FEs
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(c) Decomposition 2: Within-gap using female weights
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(d) Decomposition 2: Between-gap using male FEs
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mean of the distribution. Source: RAIS.
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B.7 Life-Cycle Profiles by Gender and Parent Status
In this section, we are interested in life-cycle patterns in employer heterogeneity and how they differ
by gender and parental status.41 We compute two types of life-cycle statistics. The first set of statistics
comprises raw, cross-sectional binned means. The second set of statistics comprises binned means of
differenced variables, which we normalize to 0 at age 18.
Figure 23 shows estimated gender-specific employer FEs by gender and parent status. A few
things are worth noting. First, cross-sectional life cycles (panels (a) and (c)) can be quite different from
the normalized life cycles (panels (b) and (d)), plausibly due to cohort effects and other dimensions of
permanent individual heterogeneity that is differenced out in the normalized statistics. Second, both
men and women see marked growth in employer FEs over their life-cycle, although men significantly
more so than women (panel (b)). Third, parent men look more similar to women in general, and
to women with children in particular, compared to nonparent men, although nonparent women still
look quite different from nonparent men (panel (d)).
Altogether, these life-cycle patterns suggest that childbirth could play some role in explaining
some part of the gender pay gap.
Figure 23. Life-cycle mean gender-specific employer FEs, by gender and parent status
(a) Cross-sectional employer pay
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(c) Cross-sectional employer pay, by parent status
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(d) Normalized employer pay, by parent status
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: Cross-sectional estimates are simple binned means. Nor-
malized estimates are binned means of differenced variable, normalized to 0 at age 18.
41We classify individuals as “parent” if they ever had a child during the sample period 2007–2014, and as “not parent” if
they did not.
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B.8 Event Study Analysis around Parental Leaves by Gender
Following Kleven et al. (2016), we estimate the following event-study regression for individual i of
gender g in year s and at event time t:
yist = ∑
t′ 6=1
α
g
t′1[t
′ = t] + ∑
a
β
g
a1[a = ageis] + ∑
s′
γ
g
s′1[s
′ = s] + ν
g
ist, (28)
where yist is the outcome variable of interest, α
g
t′ denotes a set of gender-specific event time controls,
β
g
a denotes a set of gender-specific age controls, γ
g
s′ denotes a set of gender-specific time controls, and
ν
g
ist is an error term. As dependent variables, we will use the level of earnings (filling in zero earnings
for missing observations) or, alternatively, log earnings (dropping missing observations). Our focus
will be on estimates of the coefficients αgt′ , based on equation (28), for men and women in an 11-year
window around individuals’ first child birth.
Figure 24 plots the resulting event study graph, including gender-specific point estimates and
confidence intervals. Panel (a) of the figure shows the event study for earnings in levels. Men and
women are on comparable earnings paths leading up to the time of first childbirth, marked by the
vertical black solid line. After childbirth, women’s earnings markedly decline, both in absolute value
and compared to men’s earnings, which remain relatively more stable. Panel (b) shows the event
study for earnings in logarithms. Women’s earnings show a declining pretrend in the five years
leading up to first childbirth, both in absolute terms and compared to men, whose earnings increase
over the same preperiod. After childbirth, women’s earnings take a one-year dip and then remain
relatively constant over the next five years. In contrast, men’s earnings grow over the five years
following child birth.
Figure 24. Event-study plot of earnings relative to year before first childbirth
(a) Levels
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: Vertical solid black line separates years before and after first
childbirth.
Taken at face value, these results suggest that child birth has an effect on the earnings and partici-
pation of women relative to men. However, it seems that women’s earnings losses around childbirth
are not systematically related to changes in the employer component of earnings. Figure 25 illustrates
this point by plotting an analogous event study with estimated gender-specific employer FEs from
equation (1) as the dependent variable. Men and women follow a similar trend before childbirth. In
the first two years after childbirth, women’s gender-specific employer FE falls behind that for men
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but the pattern reverses during years 3 through 5. At any time in the event study, the gender gap in
gender-specific employer FEs is less than 1 log point.
Altogether, this suggests that firm pay heterogeneity is not the only, or even a very important,
factor behind women’s childbirth pay penalty or the overall gender gap.
Figure 25. Event-study plot of gender-specific employer FEs rel. to year before first childbirth
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B.9 Details on Construction and Comparison of Employer Rank Measures
In this section, we define and implement alternative employer rank measures, which we then use to
compare to the PageRank used in the main section of the paper. All three employer rank measures
are consistent with a large class of on-the-job search models, including the structural framework that
we will develop later on. For notational convenience, we will denote in this section the PageRank of
an employer j by rg,Page (j).
Poaching rank. According to the poaching rank (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2008; Bagger and
Lentz, 2018), higher-ranked employers hire relatively more workers from employment than from un-
employment. Formally, the poaching index is defined as the share of all new hires that are due to
poached workers from other employers:
sg,poach (j) =
ng(., j)
ng(0, j) + ng(., j)
(29)
where ng(., j) is the number of gender-specific hires that employer jmakes from employment at other
establishments and ng(0, j) is the number of gender-specific hires that employer j makes from unem-
ployment. Intuitively, if the underlying employer rank of an establishment is higher, then it poaches
more workers from its competitors, so the poaching index is increasing in the underlying employer
rank. Finally, we construct the poaching rank of an employer as its rank among the set of poaching
indices constructed as in equation (29), with the lowest rank normalized to 0 and the highest rank
normalized to 100:
rg,poach (j) = 100
∑j′∈J g 1
[
sg,poach (j′) ≤ sg,poach (j)
]
Ng
(30)
Net poaching rank. According to the net poaching rank (Haltiwanger et al., 2018; Moscarini and
Postel-Vinay, 2018), higher-ranked employers hire relatively more workers from other competitors
and lose relatively fewer workers to other competitors. Formally, the net poaching index is defined as
the net growth rate of an establishment’s employment due to job-to-job transitions into and out of it:
sg,net (j) =
ng(., j)− ng(j, .)
Eg(j)
(31)
where ng(., j) is the number of hires that employer jmakes from employment at other establishments,
ng(j, .) is the number of workers that employer j loses to other establishments through job-to-job
transitions, and Eg(j) is the gender-specific size of the workforce of employer j. Intuitively, if the
underlying employer rank of an establishment is higher, then it poaches more workers from its com-
petitors and retains more of its ownworkers, so the net poaching index is increasing in the underlying
employer rank. Finally, we construct the net poaching rank of an employer as its rank among the set
of net poaching indices constructed as in equation (31), with the lowest rank normalized to 0 and the
highest rank normalized to 100:
rg,net (j) = 100
∑j′∈J g 1
[
sg,net (j′) ≤ sg,net (j)
]
Ng
(32)
Comparison of alternative employer rank measures. To compare the PageRank from the main text
with the poaching rank from equation (30) and the net poaching rank from equation (32), Figure 26
shows the relationship of themeans of the three employer rankmeasures with the estimated employer
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pay FEs by gender. There is a strong positive correlation between all three indices across genders.
Although they are not perfectly correlated, particularly in the tails, the overall shape and slope across
employer FE ranks is remarkably similar.
Figure 26. Comparison of employer rank measures
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Source: RAIS.
While all three employer rank measures are strongly related on average, there are also some im-
portant discrepancies between them. Table 16 shows rank correlations between the three employer
rank measures and also their pay rank by gender. The correlation between PageRank and poaching
rank is 0.549 for men and 0.552 for women. That between between PageRank and net poaching rank
is 0.226 for men and 0.236 for women. All three measures are positively related to pay rank, with
correlations between 0.256 and 0.469 for men and between 0.242 and 0.448 for women. Note that the
rank correlation between the net poaching rank and other employment ranks as well as pay rank is
relatively weak and suggesting a larger role for nonpay employer characteristics in explaining the
data.
Table 16. Rank correlations of various employer rank measures, by gender
Men Women
Net Net
Poaching poaching Pay Poaching poaching Pay
PageRank rank rank rank PageRank rank rank rank
PageRank 1.000 1.000
Poaching rank 0.549 1.000 0.552 1.000
Net poaching rank 0.226 0.425 1.000 0.236 0.430 1.000
Pay rank 0.400 0.469 0.256 1.000 0.359 0.448 0.242 1.000
Source: RAIS.
B.10 Further Details on Fact 2
Employer ranks versus pay by industry. We find interesting heterogeneity in pay and employer
ranks across industries for both genders. Figure 27 shows the mean pay ranks and mean employer
ranks across 25 industries, with circle sizes representing employment shares and the solid line show-
ing the weighted linear best fit. Comparing panel (a) and panel (b), the aggregate positive correlation
between employer ranks and pay ranks is again evident, as is the lower gradient for women compared
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to men. There are many similarities between industry-level mean pay ranks and mean employer
ranks across genders. For example, Footwear is the lowest-paying of all sectors, while Retail and
also Agriculture are the lowest-ranked sectors. Sectors that are high-paying and attractive for both
genders include Finance and Insurance, Utilities, and the Automobile sector. However, there are also
interesting differences across genders. For example, Agriculture, Metal, and the Rubber, Tobacco, and
Leather sector are relatively preferred by men, while the Medical sector and Public Administration
are relatively preferred by women.
Figure 27. Employer ranks versus pay across industries, by gender
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: Circle size is proportional to employment share. Solid line
is weighted linear best fit.
Regression analysis of employer rank-pay relationship. Table 17 shows the results of regressions
of employer rank on employer pay rank with various controls. Columns (1) and (4) repeat the raw
employer rank-pay rank relationship from above, which shows a gradient of 0.401 for men and 0.323
for women. In columns (2) and (5), 5-digit industry FEs are added as controls, which reduces the
gradient for both genders and somewhat more so for men, resulting in gradients of 0.364 for men
and 0.316 for women. Finally, columns (3) and (6) add municipality FEs as controls. In this richest
specification, the gradients are reduced further and by approximately the same absolutely amount for
both genders, resulting in a gradient of 0.314 for men and 0.255 for women. We conclude that there
remains a positive correlation between employer rank and pay rank that is steeper for men than for
women, even within narrowly defined industries and geographic units.
Changes in pay by type of employer rank transition. In linewith a job-ladder view of theworld, Ta-
ble 18 shows the conditional changes in earnings and in establishment FEs uponmaking an employment-
to-employment (henceforth “E-to-E”) transition between two consecutive years. We see that bothmen
and women on average see an increase in earnings (employer FEs) upon making an E-to-E transi-
tion, and disproportionately so when moving up the employer rank distribution. However, the share
of workers who see an increase in their earnings (employer FEs) upon transitioning is far below 1,
namely around 0.591 (0.630) for men and 0.586 (0.619) for women. Furthermore, the absolute change
and also the share of transitions with positive changes in earnings (employer FEs) is higher for men
than for women. From this we conclude that pay is positively but imperfectly correlated with em-
ployer ranks, and that for men pay is more closely aligned with employer ranks than it is for women.
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Table 17. Employer rank-pay rank gradient, various controls
Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employer pay rank 0.401*** 0.364*** 0.314*** 0.323*** 0.316*** 0.255***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Industry FEs X X X X
Municipality FEs X X
Observations 143,745,8690 143,745,8690 143,745,8690 88,059,962 88,059,962 88,059,962
R2 0.191 0.396 0.461 0.124 0.438 0.529
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels.
Table 18. Changes in earnings and employer FEs upon E-to-E transitions, by gender
Men Women
Overall To lower rank To higher rank Overall To lower rank To higher rank
E
[
∆yijt
]
0.031 -0.018 0.072 0.033 -0.008 0.068
E
[
1
[
∆yijt > 0
]]
0.549 0.500 0.591 0.552 0.512 0.586
E
[
∆ψj
]
0.021 -0.033 0.066 0.022 -0.024 0.060
E
[
1
[
∆ψj > 0
]]
0.540 0.435 0.630 0.541 0.449 0.619
Share 0.206 0.095 0.112 0.128 0.058 0.070
Share of E-to-E transitions 1.000 0.459 0.541 1.000 0.456 0.544
Source: RAIS.
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B.11 Further Details on Fact 3
Percentiles of employer rank distribution conditional on pay.
Figure 28. Percentiles of employer ranks conditional on pay ranks for men, by industry
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(c) Utilities
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(d) Construction
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(e) Retail & Wholesale
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Figure 29. Percentiles of employer ranks conditional on pay ranks for women, by industry
(a) Agriculture & Mining
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Dispersion in employer ranks conditional on pay.
Figure 30. Standard deviation of employer ranks conditional on pay rank, by gender
(a) Men
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Cross-gender comparisons of pay and employer ranks.
Figure 31. Female vs. male pay, by industry
(a) Agriculture & Mining
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Figure 32. Female vs. male employer ranks, by industry
(a) Agriculture & Mining
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C Model Appendix
C.1 Definition of a Stationary Equilibrium
We are now ready to define a stationary equilibrium for this economy.
Definition. A stationary search equilibrium is a set of worker value functions {Sa,g,Wa,g}a,g and policy func-
tions {φa,g}a,g; firm value function Π and policy functions {wa,g,pia,g, va,g}a,g; flow-utility offer distributions
{Fa,g(x)}a,g; measures of unemployed workers {ua,g}a,g, aggregate job searchers {Ua,g}a,g, aggregate vacan-
cies {Va,g}a,g, and labor market tightnesses {θa,g}a,g; job offer arrival rates {λua,g,λ
e
a,g,λ
G
a,g}a,g; and firm sizes
{la,g}a,g such that for all (a, g):
• Given Fa,g(x) and {λua,g,λ
e
a,g,λ
G
a,g}, the value functions Sa,g and Wa,g satisfy equations (5) and (6);
• Unemployed workers’ job acceptance policy follows a threshold rule φa,g given by equation (7) and em-
ployed workers with flow utility x accept any job x′ such that x′ > x;
• Given la,g, firms’ value function Π is given by equation (9);
• Firms policy functions {wa,g,pia,g, va,g} solve the problem in equation (9);
• Measures of unemployed workers are given by equation (8), aggregate job searchers Ua,g are given by
equation (10), aggregate vacancies Va,g are given by equation (11), and labor market tightness θa,g is
given by equation (12).
• Given θa,g, the job offer arrival rates {λua,g,λ
e
a,g,λ
G
a,g} satisfy equation (13);
• Given Fa,g(x), {λua,g,λ
e
a,g}a,g,λ
G
a,g, and Va,g, firm sizes satisfy equation (14);
• The offer distribution satisfies Fa,g(x) =
´
j va,g(j)1[xa,g(j) ≤ x] dΓ(j)/Va,g.
C.2 Additional Proofs
C.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1 (Optimal Amenities)
Proof. Based on the insight that workers care only about the flow utility of a job, we can rewrite the
problem of a firm in equation (9) as one of choosing in each market a flow utility x and vacancies v
that solve the following problem:
max
x,v
{[
pa− cxa,g(x)− za,g
]
la,g(x, v)− cva,g(v)
}
, ∀(a, g),
where cxa,g(x) is the solution to the following cost-minimization subproblem in each market:
cxa,g(x) = minw,pi
{
w+ cpia,g(pi)
}
s.t. w+ pi = x (33)
Once written in this way, it is evident that an interior solution to the firm’s cost-minimization problem
in equation (33) is characterized by the following optimality conditions:
cpi,0a,g ×
∂c˜pia (pi
∗)
∂pi
= 1 (34)
w∗ = x− pi∗, ∀(a, g)
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Equation (34) uniquely pins down a firm’s optimal amenity choice pi∗a,g(c
pi,0
a,g ) for every market a as a
function of only the heterogeneous amenity cost shifter cpi,0a,g . Obviously, ∂pi∗/∂c
pi,0
a,g < 0 by the chain
rule. The optimal wage is then chosen to deliver the remainder of flow utility x.42
Since c˜pia (0) = 0 and ∂c˜
pi
a /∂pi(0) = 0, a firm will always create some amount of amenities pia,g > 0.
Finally, we have
cpia,g(pi
∗) =
ˆ pi∗
0
∂c˜pia (pi)
∂pi
dpi <
ˆ pi∗
0
1 dpi = pi∗ .
C.2.2 Proof of Lemma 2 (Optimal Market Selection)
Proof. Recall that composite productivity is defined as output value plus amenity value net of amenity
production costs minus employer distaste, p˜a,g = pa+ pia,g − cpia,g(pia,g)− za,g. Since the vacancy cost
function satisfies cva,g(0) = 0 and ∂c
v
a,g(0)/∂v = 0, a firm makes positive profits if and only if it makes
positive profits per worker: p˜a,g− x > 0. To attract workers in a market, a firm has to offer flow utility
equal to or higher than the outside option of workers through a combination of wages and amenities:
x ≥ φa,g. Therefore, a firm is profitably active in a market if and only if p˜a,g > φa,g.
C.2.3 Proof of Lemma 3 (Optimal Vacancies)
Proof. We first reformulate the firm’s problem. Expected profits per worker contacted by a firm is
pia,g( p˜, x) = ha,g(x)Ja,g( p˜, x),
where ha,g(x) is the acceptance probability and Ja,g( p˜, x) is the value of employing a worker to a firm
with composite productivity p˜ providing flow utility x. Under the assumption that firms maximize
long-run profits, the value of employing a worker is simply
Ja,g( p˜, x) =
p˜− x
δa,g + λea,g(1− Fa,g(x)) + λGa,g
=
( p˜− x) /
(
δa,g + λGa,g
)
1+ κea,g
(
1− Fa,g (x)
) ,
42Taking into account possible corner solutions, the optimal wage-amenity combination takes the following form:
pi∗∗a,g
(
x, cpi,0a,g
)
=
x if x < x
(
cpi,0a,g
)
pi∗a,g
(
cpi,0a,g
)
if x ≥ x
(
cpi,0a,g
) , w∗∗a,g (x, cpi,0a,g ) =
0 if x < x
(
cpi,0a,g
)
x− pi∗∗a,g
(
cpi,0a,g , x
)
if x ≥ x
(
cpi,0a,g
)
,
where x
(
cpi,0a,g
)
solves ∂cpia,g(x
(
cpi,0a,g
)
)/∂pi = 1. Note, however, that in such corner solutions the optimal wage is w∗∗ = 0,
which is empirically not relevant. Naturally, going forward we focus on the case of an interior solution.
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where κea,g = λ
e
a,g/(δa,g + λ
G
a,g). The acceptance probability for a firm offering x is
ha,g(x) =
ua,g + sea,g
(
1− ua,g
)
Ga,g (x) + sGa,g
ua,g + sea,g
(
1− ua,g
)
+ sGa,g
=
δa,g + sea,g
(
λua,g + λ
G
a,g
)
Ga,g (x) + sGa,g
(
δa,g + λua,g + λ
G
a,g
)
δa,g + sea,g
(
λua,g + λ
G
a,g
)
+ sGa,g
(
δa,g + λua,g + λ
G
a,g
)
=
1+ sea,gκ
u
a,gGa,g (x) + s
G
a,g
(
1+ κua,g
)
1+ sea,gκua,g + sGa,g
(
1+ κua,g
)
=
1+ sea,gκ
u
a,g
[
Fa,g(x)
1+κea,g[1−Fa,g(x)]
]
+ sGa,g
(
1+ κua,g
)
1+ sea,gκua,g + sGa,g
(
1+ κua,g
)
=
1+ κea,g
[
1− Fa,g (x)
]
+ sea,gκ
u
a,gFa,g (x) + s
G
a,g
(
1+ κua,g
) [
1+ κea,g
[
1− Fa,g (x)
]][
1+ sea,gκua,g + sGa,g
(
1+ κua,g
)] [
1+ κea,g
[
1− Fa,g (x)
]] ,
where κua,g = (λ
u
a,g + λ
G
a,g)/δa,g and ua,g is substituted with its expression in equation (8). Combining
expressions, expected profits per contacted worker are
pi ( p˜, x) = h (x) J ( p˜, x)
=
{
1+ κea,g
[
1− Fa,g (x)
]
+ sea,gκ
u
a,gFa,g (x) + s
G
a,g
(
1+ κua,g
) [
1+ κea,g
[
1− Fa,g (x)
]]}
( p˜− x)[
1+ sea,gκua,g + s
G
a,g
(
1+ κua,g
)] [
1+ κea,g
(
1− Fa,g (x)
)]2 (
δa,g + λGa,g
) . (35)
Then the firm’s problem becomes
max
x,v
{
pia,g ( p˜, x) vqa,g − cva,g (v)
}
.
where qa,g is defined in equation (13). Therefore, the optimal flow-utility and vacancy policy functions
satisfy
x∗a,g ( p˜, ·) = argmax
x
pia,g ( p˜, x)
∂cva,g (v
∗ ( p˜, ·))
∂v
= max
x
pia,g ( p˜, x) . (36)
Since the vacancy cost function cv (·) is convex, and pi ( p˜, x) in equation (35) is strictly increasing
in p˜, then it follows from an application of the envelope theorem to equation (36) that v∗ ( p˜, ·) is
strictly increasing in p˜. Therefore, v∗a,g(·) is strictly increasing in productivity p and strictly decreasing
(constant) in za for women (men). Since cva,g(va,g) = c
v,0
a,g × c˜
v(pia,g), equation (36) also yields that
optimal mass of vacancies is strictly decreasing in the vacancy cost shifter cv,0a,g.
C.2.4 Proof of Lemma 4 (Optimal Flow Utility and Wages)
Proof. We proceed in two steps.
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Step 1. In the first step, we prove monotonicity of x∗a,g in components of p˜a,g. Lemma 1 implies that,
at the optimum, amenities can be equivalently considered exogenous. Thus, we rewrite the FOCs as
functions of exogenous parameters, the endogenous offer distribution, and xa,g:
[∂xa,g] : 1 = ( p˜a,g − xa,g)
2λea,g fa,g(xa,g)
δa,g + λGa,g + λea,g(1− Fa,g(xa,g))
(37)
[∂va,g] : cv,0a,g
∂c˜v(va,g)
∂va,g
= Ta,g( p˜a,g − xa,g)
(
1
δa,g + λGa,g + λea,g(1− Fa,g(xa,g))
)2
, (38)
where Ta,g = µa,g[(ua,g + sGa,g)λ
u
a,g(δa,g + λ
G
a,g + λ
e
a,g)]/Va,g. Equation (37) already shows that the opti-
mal flow utility xa,g is independent of the cost of posting vacancies, proving the first statement. Now
consider equation (38); because the term on the right-hand side is always positive for p˜a,g > φa,g, it
follows that optimal vacancies v∗a,g( p˜a,g, c
v,0
a,g) are always strictly positive.
We now show that the derivative of wageswith respect to p˜a,g is always positive. Define ha,g( p˜a,g) =
Fa,g(x∗a,g( p˜a,g)). Thus:
ha,g( p˜a,g) =
ˆ p˜a,g
p˜′≥φa,g
v∗a,g( p˜a,g)γa,g( p˜a,g)
Va,g
d p˜′ (39)
h′a,g( p˜a,g) = fa,g(x
∗
a,g( p˜a,g)) x
∗
a,g
′( p˜a,g) (40)
fa,g(x
∗
a,g( p˜a,g)) =h
′
a,g( p˜a,g)/x
∗
a,g
′( p˜a,g), (41)
where v∗a,g( p˜a,g) =
ˆ
v∗a,g( p˜a,g, c
′)γca,g(c
′| p˜a,g) dc
′ is the integral of optimal vacancies conditional on
p˜a,g and γca,g(c| p˜a,g) is the density of vacancy posting costs c
v,0
a,g conditional on p˜a,g, γa,g( p˜a,g) is the
marginal density of composite productivity p˜a,g and ∂x∗a,g( p˜a,g)/∂ p˜a,g = x
∗
a,g
′( p˜a,g) is the derivative
of equilibrium flow utility with respect to p˜a,g. Thus, we can rewrite h′a,g( p˜a,g) =
v∗a,g( p˜a,g)
Va,g
γ( p˜a,g) by
differentiating equation (39) using Leibniz’s integral rule.
Using these identities, we can write fa,g(x∗a,g( p˜a,g)) =
v∗a,g( p˜a,g)
Va,g
γa,g( p˜a,g)∂ p˜a,g/∂x∗a,g( p˜a,g). Thus, we
can rewrite equation (37) as
∂x∗a,g( p˜a,g)
∂ p˜a,g
= ( p˜a,g − x
∗
a,g)
2λea,g
δa,g + λGa,g + λ
e
a,g(1− ha,g( p˜a,g))
v∗a,g( p˜a,g)
Va,g
γa,g( p˜a,g). (42)
Because the right-hand side of this expression is always positive for p˜a,g > φa,g, it follows that
∂x∗a,g( p˜a,g)/∂ p˜a,g > 0, thus proving that equilibrium flow utility is increasing in p˜a,g.
Since p˜a,g is increasing in p and decreasing (constant) in za for women (men), it follows that optimal
flow utility is increasing in p and decreasing (constant) in za for women (men).
Step 2. In the second step, we provemonotonicity ofwa,g in components of p˜a,g. The characterization
of wa,g = xa,g − pia,g follows from combining Lemmas 1 and 4.
C.2.5 Proof of Lemma 5 (Optimal Employment)
Proof. Consider two otherwise identical employers with composite productivities p˜2 > p˜1 and op-
timal flow-utility and amenity choices (x2, v2) and (x1, v1), respectively. Using the notation from
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equation (15), we can write
[ p˜2 − x2] la,g(x2, v2)− cva,g(v2) > [ p˜2 − x1] la,g(x1, v1)− c
v
a,g(v1)
> [ p˜1 − x1] la,g(x1, v1)− cva,g(v1) > [ p˜1 − x2] la,g(x2, v2)− c
v
a,g(v2),
where the first and third strict inequalities follow from uniqueness of the profit-maximizing wage
choice given that firm types are distributed continuously, while the second strict inequality follows
trivially. Subtracting the fourth term from the first and the third term from the second, we have
la,g(x2, v2) > la,g(x1, v1). This proves the comparative statics with respect to firm productivity p and
the intra-employer wedge za,g. The proof for the comparative statics with respect to the vacancy cost
shifter cv,0a,g is a direct consequence of the two results that the vacancy policy va,g(·) is strictly decreasing
in cv,0a,g (Lemma 3), while the flow-utility policy xa,g(·) is constant in c
v,0
a,g (Lemma 4).
C.2.6 Proof of Proposition 1 (EquilibriumWage Equation)
Proof. We proceed in two steps. We first prove the proposition under exogenous firm-level vacancies
that are constant within but may differ across genders. We then prove that under the maintained
assumptions the propositions also holds under endogenous vacancy posting.
Step 1. Suppose firms differ in their exogenous number of vacancies for each gender, {vg}g. Define
Ta,g = µa,g[(ua,g + sGa,g)λ
u
a,g(δa,g + λ
G
a,g + λ
e
a,g)]/Va,g. First of all, Assumption 2 implies that Ta,g = Tg
for all a. Second, under exogenous vacancies a firm’s type is defined by its composite productivity
p˜a,g and its exogenous vacancies vg, which are constant across ability markets. As a consequence,
Va,g = Vg in all a-markets. Using equation (14), the firm’s problem can be written as
x∗a,g( p˜a,g) = argmax
x
( p˜a,g − x)
(
1
δa,g + λGa,g + λ
e
a,g(1− Fa,g(x))
)2
vgTg
Thus, given fixed vacancies, equilibrium firm profits in equation 15 can be written as
Πa,g( p˜a,g, vg) = ( p˜a,g − x∗( p˜a,g))
(
1
δa,g + λGa,g + λ
e
a,g(1− Fa,g(x∗( p˜a,g))
)2
vgTg (43)
We can write the offer distribution as
Fa,g(x
∗( p˜a,g)) = ha,g( p˜a,g) =
1
Va,g
ˆ p˜a,g
p′>φa,g
ˆ
vgγ(p
′, v′) dp′ dv′,
where γa,g(p′, v′) is the joint density function of p˜a,g and vg, and ha,g( p˜a,g) is the CDF of the marginal
distribution of p˜a,g, in which values are weighted by vacancies posted by firms with each particular
p˜a,g. The expression for ha,g is equivalent to equation (39) in Lemma 4, except that here we are inte-
grating over exogenous rather than endogenous vacancies. Applying the Envelope Theorem yields
∂Πa,g( p˜a,g, vg)
∂ p˜a,g
=
(
1
δa,g + λGa,g + λ
e
a,g(1− ha,g( p˜)
)2
vgTa,g (44)
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When p˜a,g = φa,g, Π(φa,g, vg) = 0 for all vg, which gives us a boundary condition to solve the differ-
ential equation for profits. Rearranging (43) and integrating equation (44) yields
xa,g
(
p˜a,g
)
= p˜a,g −
p˜a,gˆ
y≥φa,g
[1+ κea,g(1− ha,g( p˜a,g))
1+ κea,g(1− ha,g(y))
]2
dy, (45)
where κea,g = λ
e
a,g/(δa,g + λ
G
a,g). This equation parallels equation (47) in Burdett and Mortensen (1998),
where composite productivity p˜a,g in the current model plays the role of job productivity differentials
in their model.
Equation (34) and Assumption 3 imply that optimal amenities satisfy
cpi,0a,g ×
∂c˜pia (pi
∗
a,g)
∂pi
= 1
acpi,0g
a
∂c˜pi(
pi∗a,g
a )
∂pi
= 1
which obviously implies that pi∗g = pi
∗
a,g/a is constant for all ability types a. Thus, amenities pi
∗
a,g
are proportional to ability. Also, the cost function implies that cpia,g(pi
∗
a,g) = ac˜
pi
g (pig), so that also the
equilibrium amenity cost is proportional to ability.
Summing up, under Assumptions 1 and 3, it follows that pia,g = apig, cpia,g(pia,g) = ac
pi
g (pig) and
za = az. Therefore, composite productivity p˜a,g = p a+ pia,g − cpia,g(pia,g)− 1(g = F)za is proportional
to a, and we can write p˜a,g = ap˜g, where p˜g = p+pig− cpig (pig)− 1(g = F)z is distributed according to
hg( p˜g). By definition, ha,g( p˜a,g) = ha,g(ap˜g) = hg( p˜g). Due to Assumption 2, κa,g = κg for all a. Thus,
with a change of variables and using that vacancies of each firm are constant across ability markets,
we can rewrite equation (45) as
xg
(
a, p˜g
)
= ap˜g −
p˜gˆ
y≥φa,g
a
[1+ κeg(1− hg( p˜g)
1+ κeg(1− hg(y))
]2
dy, (46)
We still need to prove that φa,g is also proportional to a under the assumption that ba,g = abg. We
use a guess-and-verify approach: we guess that the case in which φa,g and equilibrium flow utility
x
(
p˜g, vg
)
are proportional to a is an equilibrium of the model and we verify it below. From equation
(7) and Assumptions 1–4, we have
φa,g = abg + (λ
u
g − λ
e
g)
ˆ
x′≥φa,g
1− Fa,g(x′)
ρ + δg + λGg + λ
e
g(1− Fa,g(x′))
dx′ .
We proceed to show that, if φa,g = aφg, then x
(
p˜g
)
is also proportional to a. The proof follows trivially
from equation (46): if φa,g = aφg,
xg
(
a, p˜g
)
= ap˜g − a
p˜gˆ
y≥φg
[1+ κeg(1− hg( p˜g)
1+ κeg(1− hg(y))
]2
dy .
Next we show that, if x
(
a, p˜g
)
is proportional to a, then φa,g must be proportional to a. Consider the
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bijective mapping p˜g(x, a) = [x∗(a, p˜g)]−1. We can rewrite the outside option as
φa,g =abg + (λ
u
g − λ
e
g)
ˆ
x′≥φa,g
1− ha,g([x′(a, p˜g)]−1)
ρ + δg + λGg + λ
e
g(1− ha,g([x′(a, p˜g)]−1))
dx′
=abg + a(λ
u
g − λ
e
g)
ˆ
x′≥φa,g
1− hg([x′(1, p˜g)]−1)
ρ + δg + λGg + λ
e
g(1− ha,g([x′(1, p˜g)]−1))
dx′ ,
which implies that the only solution to this equation satisfies φa,g = aφg.
Finally, recalling that p˜g = p+ pig− cpig (pig)− z and that w = x−pi, we can write monetary wages
as
w
(
a, p˜g, cpi,0g
)
= a
 p˜g − pig(cpi,0g )−
p˜gˆ
p˜′≥φg
[ 1+ κeg(1− hg( p˜g)
1+ κeg(1− hg( p˜′))
]2
dp˜′
 , (47)
which completes the proof that the desired equilibriumwage equation holds under exogenous vacan-
cies that are constant across ability levels.
Step 2. All that remains to be shown for the desired result to follow is that in themodel with endoge-
nous vacancy posting we have v∗a,g = v
∗
g for all a, so that the offer distribution ha,g is the same across
all ability markets. Under Assumption 1 we have cv,0a,g = ac
v,0
g . Next, we follow a guess-and-verify
approach. Suppose that x∗a,g( p˜g) is proportional to ability a. Using that Fa,g(x
∗
a,g( p˜a,g)) = ha,g( p˜a,g), we
can write the first-order condition for vacancy creation in equation (38) as
acv,0g
∂c˜vg(va,g)
∂va,g
= Ta,g( p˜a,g − x
∗
a,g( p˜a,g)
(
1
δa,g + λGa,g + λ
e
a,g(1− ha,g( p˜a,g))
)2
cv,0g
∂c˜vg(va,g)
∂va,g
= Tg( p˜g − x
∗
g( p˜g)
(
1
δg + λGg + λ
e
g(1− hg( p˜g))
)2
,
immediately proving that va,g = vg for all a. Equation (11) thus implies that aggregate vacancies
satisfy Va,g = Vg which, together with Assumption 2, also implies that in equilibrium ua,g = ug and
λua,g = λ
u
g . As a consequence, all terms in the wage equation (47) scale linearly in ability. Therefore,
log wages take the form of the desired equilibrium wage equation.
C.3 Alternative Modeling Assumptions on Vacancy Posting
C.3.1 Model Alternative 1: Directed Vacancy Posting with Joint Cost Function
As a first alternative to the benchmark model, suppose that, instead of the vacancy cost being sepa-
rable across genders, we assume that the vacancy cost is a function of the total number of vacancies
posted. This model has the strong prediction that any firm will employ either only men, or only
women, except in knife-edge cases.
Setup. Each firm posts a number va,M of vacancies targeted at male workers and va,F vacancies
targeted at women. The total cost of posting (va,M, va,F) vacancies for men and women is given by
cva(va,M + va,F), where the function c
v
a retains the properties laid out in the main text: c
v
a(0) = 0,
∂cva(·)/∂v > 0, ∂
2cva(·)/∂v
2
> 0.
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Equilibrium characterization. To see that this setup implies gender segregation except in knife-edge
cases, note that the firm’s problem can now be written as
max
xa,M ,xa,F ,va,M ,va,F
{
∑
g=M,F
( p˜a,g − xa,g)la,g(xa,g, va,g)− cva(va,M + va,F)
}
The FOCs with respect to vacancy posting now read
[∂va,M] : cva
′(va,M + va,F) = Ta,M( p˜a,M − xa,M)
(
1
δa,M + λGa,M + λ
e
a,M(1− Fa,M(xa,M))
)2
, (48)
[∂va,F] : cva
′(va,M + va,F) = Ta,F( p˜a,F − xa,F)
(
1
δa,F + λGa,F + λ
e
a,F(1− Fa,F(xa,F))
)2
. (49)
Putting equations (48) and (49) into simple economic terms, themarginal cost of an additional vacancy
(the left-hand side) is equated to the marginal benefit of an additional vacancy (the right-hand side).
The latter consists of an increase in the employment of that worker type multiplied by the profits
made per worker of that type, which is independent of the amount of vacancies posted. This is
because wages are set according to other first-order conditions, which do not depend on the amount
of vacancies posted by that firm.
Since the right-hand sides in equations (48) and (49) are generically not equal, except in knife-edge
cases, it follows that not both FOCs can hold. This means that the firm will be at a corner solution
with regards to one of the two genders, and this must invove posting zero vacancies for that gender.
Empirical shortcomings. According to the above analysis, except for knife-edge cases, firms would
hire only men or only women—whichever gives the highest marginal benefit to the firm. This model
implication is empirically counterfactual since the vast majority of firms in the real world employ a
mix of men and women.
C.3.2 Model Alternative 2: Undirected Vacancy Posting
As a second alternative to the benchmark model, suppose that, instead of vacancies being directed
to men and women separately, we assume that firms cannot discriminate between genders in their
recruiting. While qualitatively such a model can account for dual-gender firms it turns out that,
quantitatively, such a model clearly fails to replicate the empirical distribution of female employment
shares across firms that we documented in Section 3.2.
Setup. Each firm posts a number va of gender-neutral vacancies for workers of each ability level at
cost cva(va). In such a model, a firm’s problem can be written as
max
xa,M ,xa,F ,va
{
∑
g=M,F
( p˜a,g − xa,g)la,g(xa,g, va)− cva(va)
}
Notice that we do not impose that firms hire both genders in each submarket: it is always possible
for a firm to offer flow utility xa,g < φa,g such that no worker of gender g will accept it. Conse-
quently, while a total of Va vacancies are posted in each submarket in the aggregate, only Va,g ≤ Va =´
va( p˜a,g, c
v,0
a,g) dΓa,g( p˜a,g, c
v,0
a,g) vacancies are accepted in equilibrium by workers of type (a, g). This
implies that the number of matches produced in the labor market is given by
ma,g = χa,g[µa,g(ua,g + s
e
a,g(1− ua,g) + s
G
a,g)]
αV1−αa
Va,g
Va
,
which already incorporates the probability that a worker of gender g will meet a vacancy that is
associated with a wage below the reservation threshold, leading to a rejection. It is straightforward to
show that this matching function exhibits all the properties of standard matching functions, and that
in particular fa,g/qa,g = Va/[ua,g + sea,g(1− ua,g) + s
G
a,g], where fa,g = ma,g/[ua,g + s
e
a,g(1− ua,g) + s
G
a,g]
is the job-finding rate per effective job searcher and qa,g = ma,g/Va is the vacancy yield rate.
Equilibrium characterization. The following equation represents the law of motion of firm sizes:
l˙a,g(x, v) =− δa,gla,g(x, v)− sa,gλea,g(1− Fa,g(x))la,g(x, v)+
vqa,g
[
ua,g + sGa,g
ua,g + sGa,g + (1− ua,g)sea,g
+
(1− ua,g)sea,g
ua,g + sGa,g + (1− ua,g)sa,g)
Ga,g(x)
]
Solving for the stationary solution:
la,g(xa,g, va) =
(
1
δa,g + λGa,g + λ
e
a,g(1− Fa,g(xa,g))
)2
va
Va
µa,g(ua,g + s
G
a,g)λ
u
a,g(δa,g + λ
G
a,g + λ
e
a,g) (50)
To find the firm’s policy functions, define Ta,g = µa,g[ua,gλua,g(δa,g + sa,gλ
u
a,g)]/Vaand composite pro-
ductivity p˜a,g = ap+ pia,g − cpia,g(pia,g − 1[g = F]za. we rewrite the firm’s problem as a function of the
steady state mass of employed workers as follows:
max
xa,M ,xa,F ,va
{
Ta,Mva( p˜a,M − xa,M)
(
1
δa,M + λGa,M + λ
e
a,M(1− Fa,M(xa,M))
)2
+ Ta,Fva( p˜a,F − xa,F)
(
1
δa,F + λGa,F + λ
e
a,F(1− Fa,F(xa,F))
)2
− ca(va)
}
The associated FOCs read
c′(va) = Ta,M( p˜a,M − xa,M)
(
1
δa,M + λGa,g + λ
e
a,M(1− Fa,M(xa,M))
)2
+ Ta,F( p˜a,F − xa,F)
(
1
δa,F + λGa,g + λ
e
a,F(1− Fa,F(xa,F))
)2
1 = ( p˜a,M − xa,M)
2λea,M fa,M(xa,M)
δa,M + λGa,M + λ
e
a,M(1− Fa,M(xa,M))
1 = ( p˜a,F − xa,F)
2λea,F fa,F(xa,F)
δa,F + λGa,F + λ
e
a,F(1− Fa,F(xa,F))
.
Empirical shortcomings. Recall from Section 3.2 that firm-level female employment shares are dis-
persed, ranging from almost 0 to almost 1 in the data. It is this salient feature of the data that the
undirected-vacancy-posting model fails to replicate. To demonstrate this, we show that analytically-
derived expressions for the lowest and highest female employment shares are inconsistent with the
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data for realistic calibrations of the labor market parameters guiding worker flows.
Using equation (50), we can write the female share of a firm as
s f =
la,F(xa,F, va)
la,F(xa,F, va) + la,M(xa,M, va)
=
1
1+
(
1
δa,M+λ
G
a,M+λ
e
a,M(1−Fa,M(xa,M))
)2
(ua,M+s
G
a,M)λ
u
a,M(δa,M+λ
G
a,M+λ
e
a,M)(
1
δa,F+λ
G
a,F+λ
u
a,F(1−Fa,F(xa,F))
)2
(ua,F+s
G
a,F)λ
u
a,F(δa,F+λ
G
a,F+λ
e
a,F)
On the right-hand side, we can substitute our empirical estimates of the U-E transition rates λua,g, the
E-U transition rates δa,g, the compulsory offer arrival rate λGa,g, the voluntary offer arrival rate λ
e
a,g and
the compulsory offer search units sGa,g from Table 4. Thus, we obtain:
(ua,M + s
G
a,M)λ
u
a,M(δa,M + λ
G
a,M + λ
e
a,M) =(0.243+ 0.119)× 0.100× (0.036+ 0.012+ 0.006) ≈ 0.0020
(ua,F + s
G
a,F)λ
u
a,F(δa,F + λ
G
a,F + λ
e
a,F) =(0.240+ 0.107)× 0.087× (0.031+ 0.009+ 0.005) ≈ 0.0014.
Thus, this ratio is approximately equal to 0.0020/0.0014 = 1.429 and the expression simplifies to
s f =
1
1+ 1.429×
(
δa,F+λ
G
a,F+λ
e
a,F(1−Fa,F(xa,F))
δa,M+λ
G
a,M+λ
e
a,M(1−Fa,M(xa,M))
)2 = 1
1+ 1.429×
(
0.040+0.005×(1−Fa,F(xa,F))
0.048+0.006×(1−Fa,M(xa,M))
)2 .
Since firm sizes are monotonically increasing in flow utility x offered by the firm, we can obtain ex-
pressions for the minimum female employment share s f and the maximum female employment share
s f by focusing on employers that are at the very top of the job ladder for one gender and simultane-
ously at the very bottom of the job ladder for the other gender. Specifically, among all dual-gender
firms, the firm with the highest female employment share has Fa,F = 1 and Fa,M = 0. Conversely, the
firm with the lowest female employment share has Fa,F = 0 and Fa,M = 1.
Thus, we find that the minimum (maximum) female employment share in the model is ≈ 0.444
(0.561), which is inconsistent with the minimum (maximum) female employment share being close to
0 (1) in the data.
We further scrutinize the properties of the undirected-vacancy-posting model using the numerical
solution algorithm proposed in Appendix C.4.
C.4 Undirected-Vacancy-Posting Model Solution Algorithm
The undirected-vacancy-posting model is challenging because it does not allow us to solve men and
women as two separate differential equations. Thus, we rely on a different algorithm to solve the
undirected-vacancy-posting vacancy posting model.
Assume c(va) = c
v2a
2 . Then,
va =
Ta,M
c
( p˜a,M − xa,M)
(
1
δa,M + λGa,M + λ
e
a,M(1− Fa,M(xa,M))
)2
+
Ta,F
c
( p˜a,F − xa,F)
(
1
δa,F + λGa,M + λ
e
a,F(1− Fa,F(xa,F))
)2
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By definition:
Va,M =
ˆ ˆ
va I[ p˜a,M > φa,M] γ( p˜a,M, p˜a,F) dp˜a,M dp˜a,F
Va,F =
ˆ ˆ
va I[ p˜a,F > φa,F] γ( p˜a,M, p˜a,F) dp˜a,M dp˜a,F
Va =
ˆ ˆ
va I[ p˜a,M > φa,M OR p˜a,F > φa,F] γ( p˜a,M, p˜a,F) dp˜a,M dp˜a,F
Start by defining γ( p˜a,M) as the marginal distribution of p˜a,M. Also, define
v¯a( p˜a,M) =
ˆ
v( p˜a,M, p˜a,F)γ( p˜a,M, p˜a,F)
γ( p˜a,M)
dp˜a,F
as the average vacancies posted by firms with composite productivity for men p˜a,M. Then we can
write
h( p˜) = F(x( p˜))
=⇒ h′( p˜) = f (x( p˜)) x′( p˜)
=⇒ f (x( p˜)) = h′( p˜)/x′( p˜)
v¯a( p˜a,M) =
Va,Mh
′( p˜a,M)
γ( p˜a,M)
=⇒ h′( p˜a,M) =
v¯a( p˜a,M)
Va,M
γ( p˜a,M)
(51)
Thus, the flow utility FOC can be rewritten as follows:
1 = ( p˜a,g − xa,M)
2λea,g fa,g(xa,g)
δa,g + λGa,g + λ
e
a,g(1− Fa,g(xa,g))
x′( p˜a,g) = ( p˜a,g − xa,g)
2sa,gλua,gh
′(pa,g)
δa,g + λGa,g + λ
e
a,g(1− h( p˜a,g))
We start from the case in which γ( p˜a,M, p˜a,F) is an analytical function and all marginal and condi-
tional distributions associated are easy to compute (therefore also the marginals γ( p˜a,g) are known).
Using the previous intuitions, the algorithm works as follows:
1. Start with a guess for x( p˜a,g), F(x( p˜a,g) and Va,g for each gender.
2. Calculate transition rates λua,g, λ
e
a,g and λ
G
a,g using the guess for Va,g.
3. Using the guess for the flow utility function, compute va( p˜a,M, p˜a,F) on a large grid over values
of p˜a,M and p˜a,F.
4. Normalize va to get Va,g. Use the function va to compute h′( p˜a,g) for both genders as in 51.
5. Use h′( p˜a,g) to compute the new function h( p˜a,g) = F(x( p˜a,g).
6. Use h′ and h to solve the ODE in C.4.
7. Update the wage function x( p˜a,g) and the CDF F(x( p˜a,g).
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8. Go back to step 2. Repeat until convergence.
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D Identification Appendix
D.1 Illustrative Identification Example
To illustrate how we estimate employer ranks, productivity, amenities, and employer wedges from
data onworker flows and pay across establishments, we use a simple example. For the purpose of this
simple example, we abstract from endogenous vacancy and amenity creation, and heterogeneity in
the offer densities and labor market parameters, all of which will be present in the general estimation
routine.
Consider three employers A, B, and C and a pool of nonemployed workers N. Because the PageR-
ank does not depend on employer size, we can think of all three employers as having a large number
of male and female workers. To simplify the example, we assume that each employer hires a fixed
number of male and female workers but from different sources. Employer A hires men in equal pro-
portions by poaching from B, C, and nonemployment; employer B hires from C and nonemployment
most of the time but rarely from A; while employer C hires from nonemployment most of the time
but rarely from A and B. Female worker flows are identical except that employer B hires women
from nonemployment most of the time but rarely from A and C; while employer C hires from B and
nonemployment most of the time but rarely from A. Figure 33 summarizes the labor markets for men
and women graphically.
Figure 33. Example worker flows between nonemployment and employers, by gender
(a) Men (b) Women
Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: Nodes A, B, and C represent employers. Node N represents nonemploy-
ment. Arrows represent worker flows. Numbers above arrows represent share of all worker flows from a given
node.
Estimating PageRanks based on equation (4) of Section 3.5 for this labor market yields separate
employer rankings by gender. Intuitively, employers that poach a lot of workers of a given gender
from other high-ranked employers are themselves highly ranked according to the PageRank. For
men, employer A is ranked highest (PageRank index 0.423), employer B is middle-ranked (PageRank
index 0.326), and employer C is ranked lowest (PageRank index 0.251). For women, employer A is
also ranked highest (PageRank index 0.423), employer B is ranked in lowest (PageRank index 0.251),
and employer C is middle-ranked (PageRank index 0.326). Men and women agree on employer A
being ranked highest but disagree on the ranking of the remaining two employers B and C. The
resulting PageRanks for men and women are in columns (1)–(2) of Table 19.
Suppose that pay at employers (A, B,C) is (8.0, 7.0, 4.0) for men and (8.0, 6.0, 3.8) for women, as
in columns (3)–(4) of Table 19. Suppose also that the underlying amenity values at those employers
are (1.0, 0.0, 0.0) for men and (0.0, 0.0, 2.3) for women, as in columns (5)–(6) of Table 19. Finally, sup-
pose that the underlying employer productivities are (15.9, 12.3, 4.0) as in column (13) and employer
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wedges are (5.3, 6.3, 0.0) as in column (15) of Table 19.
Table 19. Example pay, PageRanks, amenities, utilities, productivities, employer wedges
PageRanks Pay Amenities Utilities Prod. Wedge
(1) (2) (1) (2) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Emp. rM rF wM wF piM piF piM piF xM xF x̂M x̂F p p̂ z ẑ
N – – – – – – – – 4.0 6.0 4.0 6.0 – – – –
A 3 3 8.0 8.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 15.9 14.6 5.3 4.0
B 2 1 7.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 6.0 7.0 6.0 12.3 12.3 6.3 6.3
C 1 2 4.0 3.8 0.0 2.3 0.0 2.3 4.0 6.1 4.0 6.1 4.0 4.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: “Emp.” stands for employer A, B, C, or nonemployment status N. For
each gender g, wg is wage, rg is Pagerank, pig is amenity value, p is employer productivity (“Prod.”), z is
employer wedges (“Wedge”). Hats denote estimates.
How can the information on (estimated) employer ranks and pay be used to infer (unobserved)
employer productivity, amenities, and employer wedges? We proceed in five steps.
First, we pick gender-specific employer amenities to make employer ranks consistent with pay
by gender. Without loss of generality, assume amenity values are weakly positive. For men it must
be that piAM > −1.0 + pi
B
M and pi
A
M > −4.0 + pi
C
M for A to be highest-ranked, and pi
B
M > −3.0 +
piCM for B to be middle-ranked. The amenities-minimizing estimate that satisfies these inequalities
is (piAM,pi
B
M,pi
C
M) = (0.0, 0.0, 0.0). Similarly, for women it must be that pi
A
F > −2.0+ pi
B
F and pi
A
F >
−4.2+ piCF for A to be highest-ranked, and pi
B
F < −2.2+ pi
C
F for B to be lowest-ranked. The amenities-
minimizing estimate that satisfies these inequalities is (piAF ,pi
B
F ,pi
C
F ) = (0.0, 0.0, 2.3). These estimates
are summarized in columns (7)–(8) of Table 19.
Second, we derive an estimate of the outside option value by gender. To this end, we first compute
utility x̂rg = w
r
g + pi
r
g as the sum of pay and estimated amenity values for each employer. Based on
the above estimates, we have (x̂AM, x̂
B
M, x̂
C
M) = (8.0, 7.0, 4.0) and (x̂
A
F , x̂
B
F , x̂
C
F ) = (8.0, 6.0, 6.1), shown in
columns (11)–(12) of Table 19. Defining the outside option value as the lowest utility among employed
workers for each gender, φg = minr xrg, we have φ̂M = pi
N
M = 4.0 and φ̂F = pi
N
F = 6.0, as shown in the
top row of columns (9)–(10) of Table 19.
Third, we deduce composite productivities p˜rg for g = M, F based on the equilibrium wage
equation (17), which relates wrg to p˜
r
g, pi
r
g, κ
e
g, and Fg(x
r
g). Since we have already estimated κ
e
g =
λeg/(δg + λ
G
g ) in Step 2 above, we assume κ
e
M = κ
e
F = 1 for this example. Approximating the integral
in equation (17) by use of the lower Riemann (Darboux) sum, we have
p˜rg ≈ x
r
g + ∑
r′≤r
 1+ κeg
[
1− Frg
]
1+ κeg
[
1− Fr
′−1
g
]
2 ( p˜rg − p˜r−1g ) (52)
We use equation (52) recursively with (FAM, F
B
M, F
C
M) = (1, 2/3, 1/3), (F
A
F , F
B
F , F
C
F ) = (1, 1/3, 2/3), and
p˜1g = φg to estimate (̂˜pAM, ̂˜pBM, ̂˜pCM) = (14.6, 12.3, 4.0) and (̂˜pAF , ̂˜pBF , ̂˜pCF ) = (10.6, 6.0, 6.3). Note that
the estimated composite productivities satisfy monotonicity with respect to estimated utilities x̂rg and
PageRanks.
Fourth, we turn to men only in order to derive an estimate of employer productivity from the
estimated composite productivity and amenity values. Since zM = 0 by normalization, the definition
of composite productivity for men yields p = p˜rM − pi
r
M. The resulting productivity estimates are
( p̂A, p̂B, p̂C) = (14.6, 12.3, 4.0), shown in column (14) of Table 19.
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Finally, we turn to women only in order to estimate the employer wedge from the estimated
composite productivity, amenity values, and productivity. The definition of composite productiv-
ity for women yields zr = p + pirF − p˜
r
F. The resulting employer-wedge estimates are (ẑ
A, ẑB, ẑC) =
(4.0, 6.3, 0.0), shown in column (16) of Table 19.
How do we interpret these results? Our estimates confirm that pay gaps are not utility gaps and
that higher utilities are associated with higher composite productivity (Lemma 4). Focusing on em-
ployer A, we learn that equal pay (or, hypothetically, equal utility) across genders within an employer
does not imply a zero employer wedge. This is because the employer wedge captures the degree to
which an employer under- or overpays relative to the competitive benchmark described by the equi-
librium wage equation. In this case, women at employer A are paid lower relative to the value of
their outside option compared to men. Focusing on employer B, we see that the employer wedge
may be nonmonotonic across ranks based on revealed preference, pay, or productivity. This is because
differently-ranked employers may either under- or over-pay relative to the competitive benchmark.
Focusing on employer C, we note that even employers with a zero employer wedge may deliver dif-
ferent pay and utility to men compared to women. This is because differences in the outside option
value, due to either gender differences in the flow values of nonemployment or the presence of other
employers with nonzero employer wedges, are priced into wage and utility offers in equilibrium.
It is worth noting that the parameter estimates in columns (7)–(8), (11)–(12), (14) and (16) of Table
19, imperfectly approximate the underlying parameter values in columns (5)–(6), (9)–(10), (13) and
(15). Naturally, the approximation is more precise in the middle of the employer rank distribution
and becomes more accurate as we increase the number of employers in the data.43
D.2 Further Details on Identification
A challenge in estimating productivity is that fg(xrg) is unknown, because it is the density function in
the space of flow utilities x, rather than the change in the offer distribution f rg across ranks that we
estimate. We begin by substituting f rg with the kernel density estimate fˆ
r
g, for computational stability.
In other words, we need to transform the density through a change of variables: fˆg(xrg) = fˆ
r
g ∂x/∂r. To
perform the change of variables, we approximate the derivative by inserting the constraints implicitly
in our algorithm. By definition, from one rank to the next ∂r = 1. Then, we approximate ∂x =
xr+1g − x
r
g and rewrite the problem as follows:
min
{pi1g ,...piR
g
g }
∑
r
[
(wr+1g + pi
r+1
g )− (w
r
g + pi
r
g)
]2
s.t. wrg + pi
r
g ≤ w
r+1
g + pi
r+1
g , ∀r < R
g
wrg + pi
r
g +
1+ κeg(1− Fg(x
r
g))
2κeg fˆ rg
[
(wr+1g + pi
r+1
g )− (w
r
g − pi
r
g)
]
≤ wr+1g + pi
r+1
g +
1+ κeg(1− Fg(x
r+1
g ))
2κeg fˆ
r+1
g
[
(wr+2g + pi
r+2
g )− (w
r+1
g − pi
r+1
g )
]
, ∀r < Rg .
After this substitution, the problem is written only as a function of known data inputs wrg, F
r
g, f
r
g, λ
e
g,
λGg , δg and of the unknowns of the problem {pi
1
g, ...,pi
Rg
g }.
43In the real data, we work with hundreds of thousands of employers for each gender. In Appendix D.3, we report results
from Monte Carlo simulations for comparable sample sizes, which support the accuracy our estimation routine.
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D.3 Identifying Productivity and Amenities in Monte Carlo Simulations
We solve our model and simulate firm-level data on wages, amenities, ranks and vacancies. We
use this data to construct our estimates of rank r, density fr and CDF Fr, and use them to estimate
amenities and productivity at the firm level to test whether our algorithm is successful at uncovering
the true firm-specific parameters. Our results are summarized in Table 20, which shows moments of
the distribution of recovered estimates under different parametrizations of the underlying amenities
distribution.
Table 20. Monte Carlo Simulations.
Differences in the Amenity Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Properties of true pi
Variance(pi) 0.050 0.100 0.150 0.100 0.100
Corr(pi,w) -0.603 -0.668 -0.686 -0.654 -0.501
Corr(pi,rank) 0.452 0.553 0.611 0.497 0.790
Corr(w,rank) 0.408 0.229 0.138 0.314 0.094
Properties of true p
Variance(p) 0.538 0.551 0.551 0.538 0.539
Corr(p,w) 0.724 0.667 0.648 0.728 0.472
Corr(p,rank) 0.714 0.675 0.648 0.668 0.726
Corr(p,pi) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.086 0.416
Properties of estimates
Variance(pˆi) 0.075 0.083 0.135 0.168 0.061
Corr(pˆi,w) -0.277 -0.720 -0.697 -0.264 -0.710
Corr(pˆi,rank) 0.717 0.456 0.581 0.773 0.608
Variance(pˆ) 1.567 1.053 1.039 3.418 0.328
Corr(pˆ,w) 0.563 0.598 0.511 0.590 0.477
Corr(pˆ,rank) 0.743 0.867 0.871 0.849 0.849
Corr(pˆ,pˆi) 0.430 0.111 0.225 0.596 0.240
Goodness of fit
Corr(pˆi,pi) 0.933 0.989 0.997 0.893 0.965
Mean Error 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Mean Squared Error 0.011 0.003 0.001 0.036 0.010
Corr(pˆ, p) 0.908 0.933 0.931 0.942 0.960
Mean Error -0.730 0.450 0.332 -1.361 0.932
Mean Squared Error 0.724 0.294 0.242 2.399 0.528
Note: Table reports estimation results using simulated data from 300,000 firms, under different parametrizations
of the initial underlying amenities distribution.
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E Estimation Appendix
E.1 Sensitivity Analysis Across Different Employer Rank Measures
To check how sensitive our results are to the choice of ranking, we re-estimate employer-specific
parameters—productivity p, amenity values piM and piF, and employer wedges z—by applying our
estimation routine to three alternative ranking measures: the Pagerank (as in the main text), the
poaching index (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2008; Bagger and Lentz, 2018), and the net poaching
index (Haltiwanger et al., 2018; Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2018). Table 21 presents employment-
weighted correlations between various estimation objects across different employer rank measures.
Estimates across rank measures are significantly positively, albeit not perfectly, correlated. For our
baseline analysis in the main text, we use the Pagerank index because it utilizes the most information
per observed worker transition.
Table 21. Counterfactual simulations, shutting down differences across gender
Panel A. Productivity estimates
Pagerank Poaching index Net poaching index
Pagerank 1.000
Poaching index 0.338 1.000
Net poaching index 0.457 0.379 1.000
Panel B. Male amenity estimates
Pagerank Poaching index Net poaching index
Pagerank 1.000
Poaching index 0.442 1.000
Net poaching index 0.437 0.648 1.000
Panel C. Female amenity estimates
Pagerank Poaching index Net poaching index
Pagerank 1.0000
Poaching index 0.420 1.000
Net poaching index 0.446 0.864 1.000
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: Table reports pairwise correlations between estimates of
productivity, male amenities, and female amenities based on different employer rank measures.
E.2 Details on Covariates for Analysis of Amenity Estimates
We include as covariates in Eg,j in equation (25) the following fourteen variables that we construct us-
ing the RAIS data: an indicator for whether the employer provides in-kind remuneration in the form
of food stamps; the shares of workers with part-time contracts, with hours changes since the previous
year, with paid sick leave, with parental leave, with unpaid leave, with earnings cuts since the pre-
vious year, with noncontractual earnings fluctuations, with work-related accidents, with commute-
related accidents; the shares of worker separations due to firing for unjust reasons and due to worker
death; 5-digit industry dummies, and municipality dummies.
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E.3 Details on Covariates for Analysis of Employer Wedge Estimates
We include as covariates in the vector Ej in equation (26) the following twelve variables, which we
construct using the RAIS data: the mean intensity for routine-manual tasks, nonroutine-manual tasks,
routine-cognitive tasks, nonroutine cognitive tasks involving interpersonal skills, nonroutine cogni-
tive tasks involving analytical skills;44 the share of worker separations due to worker death, the share
of workers with work-related accidents; the female employment share, an indicator for whether the
highest-paid worker is a woman; an indicator for whether an employer has no major financial stake-
holder (as proxied by their participation in the small-business tax regime Simples Nacional);45 5-digit
industry dummies, and municipality dummies.
E.4 Basic Solution Algorithm
We start by feeding to themodel the estimated labor market parameters {λuM,λ
u
F, s
e
M, s
e
F, s
G
M, s
G
F , δM, δF}
and the firm-level estimates of {p,piM,piF, z, c
v,0
M , c
v,0
F }. Then, we rank firms according to “composite
productivity” p˜g for each gender. This is useful because, as stated in Lemma 4, firms that have higher
“composite productivity” will pay higher effective wages.
We must first find the equilibrium level of aggregate vacancies Vg. We invert the equation for the
offer arrival rate from unemployment in (13) to obtain:
Va,g = Ua,g
(
λug
χa,g
)1/α
.
Now consider the firm’s first order conditions for vacancies in equation (38) and the rewritten first-
order condition with respect to flow utility in equation (42). We use the same transformations that
we have used to prove Lemma 4. Define hg( p˜g) = F(x∗g(pg)). Thus, h
′
g( p˜g) = fg(x
∗
g( p˜g)) x
′
g( p˜g),
therefore f (x∗g( p˜g)) = h
′
g( p˜g)/x
′
g( p˜g). Also, v( p˜g) =
Vgh
′
g( p˜g)
γ( p˜g)
, so we can rewrite h′g( p˜g) =
vg(pg)
Vg
γ( p˜g).
We assume cvg(v) = c
v,0
g
v2
2 . Thus, we rewrite the first-order conditions as
h′g(pg) =
Tg( p˜g − xg( p˜g))
Vgc
v,0
g (pg)
(
1
δ + λGg + λ
e
g(1− hg( p˜g))
)2
γg( p˜g)
x′g( p˜g) = 2λ
e
g
Tg( p˜g − xg( p˜g))2
Vgc
v,0
g ( p˜g)
(
1
δ + λGg + λ
e
g(1− hg( p˜g))
)3
γg( p˜g)
(53)
where γg( p˜g) is the density function of p˜g. Then, after ranking all firms, we solve for wages and total
44We define task intensity as the mean z-score of a given task measures across occupations of workers at a given estab-
lishment. We obtain task measures for the Brazilian Classificação Brasileira de Ocupaçoes (CBO) occupation codes by hand-
matching them to US Census occupation codes, which are then linked to the Occupational Information Network (O*NET)
task scales constructed by Autor and Dorn (2009) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
45Eligibility for the Simples Nacional tax regime requires that the enterprise is a micro- or small business with annual rev-
enues below BRL 1,200,00 (around USD 200,000), that it has no other companies as stakeholders, that it is not internationally
owned, that it has no shareholder or partner with significant financial stakes in other companies, and that the enterprise
itself has no stake in other companies.
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vacancies posted by integrating the functions above by gender and firm-by-firm. For every firm j:
h′g,j =
Tg( p˜g,j − xg,j)
Vgc
v,0
g,j
(
1
δ + λGg + λ
e
g(1− hg,j)
)2
γg( p˜g,j)
x′g,j =
2λegTg( p˜g,j − xg,j)
2
Vgc
v,0
g,j
(
1
δ + λGg + λ
e
g(1− hgg, j)
)3
γg( p˜g,j)
hg,j+1 = hg,j + h
′
g,j( p˜g,j+1 − p˜g,j)
xg,j+1 = xg,j + x
′
g,j( p˜g,j+1 − p˜g,j)
(54)
and we calculate total vacancies obtained in equilibrium as V∗g = ∑
j
vg,jγg( p˜g,j)( p˜g,j − p˜g,j−1). We
solve the algorithm setting the initial conditions xg,0 = φg and hg,0 = 0, and we loop over a multiplier
of all vacancy cost shifters cv,0g,j until we obtain that V
∗
g = Vg. Our solution algorithm produces gender-
specific firm-level flow utility xg,j, easily converted to wages wg,j = xg,j − pig,j, gender-specific firm-
level recruiting intensities vg,j and gender-specific firm-level ranks in the offer distribution Fg,j that
are exactly identical to those observed in the data, except for small rounding errors: the correlation
between the data and the model-generated data is larger than 0.99999 for all variables, and it’s equal
to 1 by definition for ranks.
When we perform counterfactuals that involve equalizing female amenities to male amenities, we
assume that cpij,g(pig) = c
pi,0
j,g
pi2g
2 . We estimate the cost shifter c
pi,0
j,g by solving this equation for c
pi,0
j,g given
our estimates of pij,g. Thus, when a firm j was previously posting amenities pij,F for women in equi-
librium, and now this level is equalized to the level of men pij,M, we readjust composite productivity
of firm j as follows:
p˜baselinej,F = p˜− z− c
pi
j,F
pi2j,F
2
p˜
counter f actual
j,F = p˜− z− c
pi
j,M
pi2j,M
2
= p˜baselinej,F + c
pi
j,F
pi2j,F,a
2
− cpij,M
pi2j,M
2
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F Simulation Appendix
F.1 Numerical Solution Algorithm for Equal-Pay Policy
When we simulate our equal-pay policy, we cannot rely anymore on the fact that firms with higher
composite productivity p + pig − cpig (pig) − 1[g = F]z will post higher flow utility. The reason is
that now both male and female effective productivity matter for the wage posted for either gender,
because a firm has to find a single wage that maximizes total profits, which in turn depend on the
profits extracted from both genders. Instead, we maximize directly the profit function firm-by-firm:
max
w,piM ,piF ,vm,v f
{
Tmvm(p− w− c
pi
M(piM))
(
1
δm + λGm + λ
e
m(1− Fm(w+ piM))
)2
+ Tf v f (p− z− w− c
pi
F (piF))
(
1
δ f + λ
G
f + λ
e
g(1− Ff (w+ piF))
)2
− cvm(vm)− c
v
f (v f )
}
where the definitions of Tg, Fg and Vg are as in the standard solution algorithm. The only unknowns
in this problem are FM and FF, two endogenous objects to be determined in the equal-pay policy
equilibrium. Firms can still hire both genders, only one gender or none.
Denote by F} the mapping from {FM, FF} to the offer distributions implied by firms’ behaviour.
We solve the system of functional equations
FM(F
∗
M, F
∗
F ) = F
∗
M;
FF(F
∗
M, F
∗
F ) = F
∗
F ,
where Fg(F∗M, F
∗
F ) represents the offer distributions implied by the optimal choices of firms, that are
a function of the offer distributions in the economy. It’s worth noticing that the offer distributions
of both genders implicitly depend on the offer distributions of both men and women, because when
firms decide which wage to set, they have to take into account the effects this will have for attracting
both genders with respect to the competition they face in the ladder.
Therefore, we solve for the equilibrium offer distributions FM and FF as follows:
1. Start with a guess for FM and FF; compute the firm’s policy functions for optimal wages, ameni-
ties and vacancies taking FM and FF as given.
2. Aggregate optimal vacancies of firms to calculate Vg using equation (11).
3. Compute the offer distributions FM and FF that are implied by the firms’ policy functions.
4. Find FM and FF such that the offer distributions taken as given by firms and the offer distribu-
tions implied by the firms’ behavior are identical.
F.2 Counterfactual simulations when amenities are exogenous
We perform robustness checks in which we consider amenities as exogenous, so that firms are born
with them and post them at zero cost (that is, cpij,g(pij,g) = 0 for all j, g). Our results remain substantially
unchanged for all counterfactuals, becausewe find that the cost of posting amenities is relatively small
for most firms. Results for counterfactuals under the exogenous amenities assumption can be found
in Table 22 below.
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Table 22. Results from counterfactual simulations when amenities are exogenous.
Baseline Counterfactuals
Gender differences in... (0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
amenities X X X
employer tastes X X X
vacany posting costs X X X
Gender pay gap... 0.074 0.060 0.023 0.018 0.000
between employers 0.055 0.056 0.046 0.016 0.000
within employers 0.018 0.004 −0.023 0.002 0.000
Output 1.000 1.001 1.010 1.029 1.034
Worker welfare from... 0.000 0.005 0.015 −0.004 0.027
total payroll... 0.000 0.010 0.024 0.019 0.029
for men 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
for women 0.000 0.010 0.024 0.019 0.029
total amenity value... 0.000 −0.005 −0.009 −0.022 −0.002
for men 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
for women 0.000 −0.005 −0.009 −0.022 −0.002
Payroll-equivalent welfare change 0.000 0.006 0.018 −0.004 0.033
Employer welfare from... 1.000 0.995 1.010 0.986 1.039
profits 1.005 1.003 1.010 1.035 1.039
wedges −0.005 −0.008 0.000 −0.049 0.000
Total employment for men 0.757 0.757 0.757 0.757 0.757
Total employment for women 0.760 0.760 0.762 0.760 0.757
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS. Note: Table reports simulation results from model-based coun-
terfactuals. Baseline results (column 1) are compared against counterfactuals without gender differences in
amenities (column 2), in employer wedges (column 3), in vacancy posting costs (column 4), and without any
gender differences (column 5).
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